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FORUM: WORLD WAR I AND THE MAKING OF
THE MODERN AMERICAN FISCAL STATE
Lawyers, Guns, and Public Moneys: The U.S.
Treasury, World War I, and the
Administration of the Modem Fiscal State
AJAY K. MEHROTRA
World War I was a pivotal event for U.S. political and economic develop-
ment, particularly in the realm of public finance. For it was during the war
that the federal government ended its traditional reliance on regressive
import duties and excise taxes as principal sources of revenue and began
a modem era of fiscal governance, one based primarily on the direct and
progressive taxation of personal and corporate income. The wartime tax
regime, as the historian David M. Kennedy has observed, "occasioned a
fiscal revolution in the United States." 1
1. David M. Kennedy, Over Here: The First World War and American Society
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), 112. For more on the significance of World
War I to U.S. state formation, see Thomas J. Knock, To End All Wars: Woodrow Wilson
and the Quest for a New World Order (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992);
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Like other aspects of war mobilization, the fiscal revolution required
an enormous infusion of national administrative resources. Nowhere was
this more evident than within the corridors of the U.S. Treasury
Department-the executive agency responsible for creating, managing,
and defending wartime fiscal policies. Managing a global war, and a tax
system that included such novel and difficult to decipher provisions
as an "excess-profits" levy, demanded an unprecedented amount of
bureaucratic capacity. 2
The dramatic changes in tax laws and policies ushered in by the global
conflict were not inevitable or preordained. The war emergency, to be sure,
provided the principal context for the fiscal transformation, but there was
vociferous and consequential disagreement among social groups, law-
makers, and policy analysts about the specific path of U.S. public
finance before, after, and especially during the war. The political malleabil-
ity created by the crisis provided state actors with a unique opportunity to
determine the future contours of U.S. tax policy. In this sense, the wartime
fiscal revolution was not merely a functional response to the need for rev-
enue, nor was it an abrupt end to wholesale progressive tax reform, as some
scholars have suggested.3 The wartime tax system embodied, instead, a
Ronald Schaffer, America in the Great War: The Rise of the War Welfare State (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1991); Marc A. Eisner, From Warfare to Welfare State: World War
I, Compensatory State-Building, and the Limits of the Modern Order (University Park:
Pennsylvania State University Press, 2000); Ellis W. Hawley, The Great War and the
Search for Modern Order: A History of the American People and Their Institutions,
1917-1933 (New York: St. Martin's, 1979); Barry Karl, The Uneasy State: The United
States from 1915 to 1945 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983). On the details of
World War I financing, see Charles Gilbert, American Financing of World War I
(Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1970); W. Elliot Brownlee, "Social Investigation and
Political Learning in the Financing of World War I," in The State and Social
Investigation in Britain and the United States, ed. Michael J. Lacey and Mary 0. Furner
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 323-64. Scholars of U.S. political develop-
ment have recently led the way in re-emphasizing the importance of international conflicts to
U.S. domestic institutional development. See, for example, Bartholomew H. Sparrow, From
the Outside In: World War II and the American State (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University
Press, 1996); Shaped by War and Trade: International Influences on American Political
Development, ed. Ira Katznelson and Martin Shefter (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University
Press, 2002).
2. As Robert D. Cuff aptly noted, "an administrative army marched into Washington
before a military force sailed overseas." Robert D. Cuff, The War Industries Board:
Business-Government Relations During World War I (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1973), 1; W. Elliot Brownlee, Federal Taxation in America: A Short
History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 24, 5 1 n4.
3. John F. Witte, The Politics and Development of the American Income Tax (Madison:
University of Wisconsin Press, 1985), 79-87; Robert Higgs, Crisis and Leviathan:
Critical Episodes in the Growth of American Government (New York, 1987), chap. 7;
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complex continuation of the conceptual shift in public finance advanced
by prewar progressive intellectuals and political leaders, and a constraint
on the social-democratic ambitions of some populist tax reformers.
Although the wartime tax regime may not have gone as far as some acti-
vists had hoped, the unprecedented turn toward a system of steeply gradu-
ated taxes fundamentally altered the distribution of economic obligations
and the meaning of fiscal citizenship.
Among the Treasury officials who took part in creating the new tax
system, a group of elite lawyers was central to the project of building the
administrative capacity of the new fiscal state.4 These lawyers played a
vital role in constructing, administering, and defending the wartime fiscal
polity. They deployed their social and professional networks, their technical
legal skills, and their practical experiences as social and economic interme-
diaries to shape the administrative foundation of the rising modem American
fiscal state.5 By focusing on the state-building efforts and achievements of
James Weinstein, The Corporate Ideal in the Liberal State, 1900-1918 (Boston: Beacon,
1968), 214-54.
4. Legal scholars who have explored the nexus between professionalism and the rise of the
modem U.S. nation-state have generally overlooked the significance of World War I, iden-
tifying the New Deal and World War II, instead, as the defining historical moments. See, for
example, Ronen Shamir, Managing Legal Uncertainty: Elite Lawyers in the New Deal
(Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1995); Peter H. Irons, The New Deal Lawyers
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1982); Daniel R. Emst, "Dicey's Disciple on
the D.C. Circuit: Judge Harold Stephens and Administrative Law Reform, 1933-40,"
Georgetown Law Journal 90 (3) (2002): 787-812. Whereas these New Deal studies focus
primarily on the role of government lawyers as litigators, this article examines how legal pro-
fessionals applied their skills and experience as transactional lawyers to their role as govern-
ment administrators. For examples of the traditional historiography's focus on lawyers as
litigators, see Benjamin Twiss, Lawyers and the Constitution: How Laissez-faire Came to
the Supreme Court (New York: Russell and Russell, 1962); Richard Kluger, Simple
Justice: The History of Brown v. Board of Education and Black America's Struggle for
Equality (New York: Knopf, 1975); Jerold S. Auerbach, Unequal Justice: Lawyers and
Social Change in Modern America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976).
5. Scholars of Western state-formation, with their broad comparative analyses, have docu-
mented the importance of wars to the emergence of modem nation-states, but they have been
less concerned with exploring the microlevel details of World War I or with the contri-
butions made by legal professionals. Some of the leading examples of the vast literature
on wars and state-building include, Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European
States, AD 990-1990 (Cambridge: B. Blackwell, 1990); Charles Tilly, ed., The Formation
of National States in Western Europe (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1975);
Michael Mann, States, War and Capitalism: Studies in Political Sociology (New York:
Basil Blackwell, 1988); John Brewer, The Sinews of Power: War, Money, and the
English State, 1688-1783 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990); Max M.
Edling, A Revolution in Favor of Government: Origins of the US. Constitution and the
Making of the American State (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003). A notable
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these government lawyers, this article contributes to the recent scholarly
interest in uncovering the constitutive role of law and the legal profession
in developing the legitimacy of the modem liberal polity.6 Rather than
emphasizing how lawyers as litigators defended negative liberties against
the state, however, this article explores how transactional lawyers-tumed-
government administrators helped constitute the positive rights associated
with American new liberalism; how they helped build not just a civil society
separate from the moderate state, but rather a robust, fiscal polity intertwined
with U.S. public life.7
The Treasury lawyers contributed to the emergence of a new fiscal polity
in several ways. First, as leading members of the bar, they used their par-
ticular social and professional networks--developed through attendance at
elite law schools, employment at leading corporate law firms, and service
to the nation's largest businesses and wealthiest individuals-to staff and
train their offices with like-minded legal professionals committed to the
department's core institutional mission of building public trust. They
cultivated such confidence by imposing a sense of rationality onto war
financing without challenging the dominant structure of U.S. corporate
capitalism. Second, they used their concrete legal skills to help consolidate
contemporary exception that focused on the importance of World War I for the Austrian state
is Joseph Schumpeter, "The Crisis of the Tax State," (1918) in International Economic
Papers, No. 4, ed. Alan T. Peacock et al. (London: Macmillan, 1954). For a recent appraisal
of the interactions of war, law, and U.S. state-formation in the twentieth century, see Mary L.
Dudziak, "Making Law, Making War, Making America," in The Cambridge History of Law
in America, Vol. II, The Twentieth Century and After, ed. Michael Grossberg and
Christopher Tomlins (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 680-717.
6. See, for example, David A. Moss, When All Else Fails: Government as the Ultimate
Risk Manager (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2002); John Fabian Witt,
The Accidental Republic: Crippled Workingmen, Destitute Widows, and the Making of
American Accident Law (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2004); William J.
Novak, "The Myth of the 'Weak' American State," American Historical Review 113
(June 2008): 752-72; Gail Radford, "From Municipal Socialism to Public Authorities:
Institutional Factors in the Shaping of American Public Enterprise," Journal of American
History 90 (3) (December 2003): 863-91; Michelle Landis Dauber, "The Sympathetic
State" Law & History Review 23 (Summer 2005): 387-44.
7. On lawyers and the rise of different interpretations of political and legal liberalism, see
Terence C. Halliday and Lucien Karpik, eds., Lawyers and the Rise of Western Political
Liberalism (Oxford: Clarendon, 1997); Robert Gordon, "Legal Thought and Legal Practice in
the Age of American Enterprise, 1870-1920," in Professions and Professional Ideologies in
America, ed. Gerald L. Geisen (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1983), 70-
110; Maureen Cain and Christine B. Harrington, Lawyers in a Postmodern World:
Translation and Transgression (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1994); Risa L.
Goluboff, The Lost Promise of Civil Rights (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,
2007); Kenneth W. Mack, "Law and Mass Politics in the Making of the Civil Rights Lawyers,
1931-1941," Journal ofAmerican History 93 (June 2006): 37-62.
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Treasury's administrative authority. Their legal expertise was necessary to
guard the department's jurisdictional control, to delimit the reach of other
government entities, and to manage the daily details of financing a global
war. Melding their claims to professionalism with their expertise and desire
to wield state power, the Treasury lawyers were active participants in the
creation of a distinctively legal administrative state. 8
Third, as intellectual stewards, the lawyers helped formulate broad pol-
icies regarding the mix of war financing options.9 They used their contacts,
skills, and experience to search for legally viable alternative sources of rev-
enue, to channel Treasury efforts in constitutionally permissible directions,
and to remind key policymakers that the choice between taxation and
government borrowing implicated the dynamics of patriotism, wartime
sacrifice, and fiscal citizenship. 10 Fourth, and perhaps most important,
the World War I Treasury lawyers were moderators of social forces and
ideological tensions. Operating as classic, Tocquevillian arbitrators of
conflicting societal interests, they sought to mediate between populist
leaders who wanted to use the war crisis to radically reconstruct
American political economy and more conservative forces that wanted to
8. The role of expertise and social networks in U.S. state-building has been explored in
several recent studies, see, for example, Mary 0. Fumer and Barry Supple, eds., The
State and Economic Knowledge: The American and British Experiences (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1990); Daniel P. Carpenter, The Forging of Bureaucratic
Autonomy: Reputations, Networks and Policy Innovations in Executive Agencies, 1862-
1928 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2001); Michael Bernstein, A Perilous
Progress: Economists and Public Purpose in Twentieth-Century America (Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press, 2001). Brian Balogh has described "the merger of professionals
and federal administrative capacity," as the rise of the "proministrative state" during the
post-World War II period. The general, though more underdeveloped, melding of profes-
sionalism and state power can also be found during the World War I era. Brian Balogh,
Chain Reaction: Expert Debate and Public Participation in American Commercial
Nuclear Power, 1945-1975 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 12-13.
9. Stephen Skowronek has identified lawyers as the American state's "most important
intellectual resource." Skowronek, Building a New American State: The Expansion of
National Administrative Capacities, 1877-1920 (New York: Cambridge University Press,
1982), 32. Although Skowronek was referring to the role of nineteenth-century government
lawyers, his emphasis on the "intellectual skills and human talents" that lawyers brought to
the resolution of crisis situations applies equally well to the World War I Treasury depart-
ment lawyers (Ibid., 31-34); see also J. Willard Hurst, The Growth of American Law:
The Law Makers (Boston: Little Brown, 1950), 334-35; Richard Hofstadter. The Age of
Reform: From Bryan to F.D.R. (New York: Vintage Books, 1955), 156-64.
10. For more on the historical and theoretical connections between taxation and citizen-
ship, see Linda Kerber, No Constitutional Right to be Ladies: Women and the
Obligations of Citizenship (New York: Hill & Wang), 81-123; Judith N. Shklar,
American Citizenship: The Question for Inclusion (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
Press, 1991), 36-37.
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retain or extend the regressive prewar system of tariffs and consumption
taxes. 
1
In carrying out these tasks, the lawyers were not always altruistic guardians
of the public purse. In their patriotic zeal to build public trust, they did not
lose sight of their own professional and personal self-interest, particularly
when they considered their postwar opportunities. In their attempts to create
an Americanized version of an ideal-typical Weberian bureaucracy, they
maintained their allegiance to a highly marketable profession and not a
rigid civil service system. 12 Though they helped create "soak-the-rich" tax
policies that expressed egalitarian aspects of fiscal citizenship, they simul-
taneously advanced contradictory policies and unwittingly unleashed broader
economic forces that undermined the state's claims of exacting shared war-
time sacrifices. And, finally, in trying to mediate between social interests,
they nonetheless retained an unyielding and self-serving faith in corporate
capitalism as the engine of economic growth and prosperity.
Despite being the "counterpoise to the democratic element," the
Treasury lawyers set the administrative foundations of the new fiscal
polity. 13 By helping to weave direct and progressive taxation into the fabric
of American ideas, institutions, and legal culture, they ironically set in
motion patterns of public financing that would usher in a new fiscal
order and fundamentally transform American life-well beyond what
these government lawyers could have anticipated. Many of them likely
looked back on their wartime efforts with an ambivalent mix of satisfaction
and chagrin. Although they did their part to make the world "safe
for democracy," in the process they also helped establish a new fiscal
regime that tremendously expanded the potential powers of the activist
liberal state. The retrenchment of the postwar decade and the economic
shocks of the Great Depression arrested the development of certain
aspects of the new fiscal polity. And it would take a second total war to
institutionalize the mass income tax and provide greater legitimacy for
the positive state. But the crucible of World War I solidified the foun-
dations of the new fiscal state. The transformation that began with the
11. Alexis De Tocqueville, Democracy in America, 2 Vols. (New York: Vintage, 1945),
1:282-88. The broader role of professionalism in moderating conflicting forces and maintain-
ing order is also identified with the social theory of Emile Durkheim, The Division of Labor
in Society, trans. Joseph Ward Swain (New York: Free Press, 1933); Richard Abel,
American Lawyers (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 34-39; John Fabian Witt,
Patriots and Cosmopolitans: Hidden Histories of American Law (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 2007), 13, 81-82.
12. Max Weber, "Bureaucracy," in From Max Weber. Essays in Sociology, ed. Hans H.
Gerth and C. Wright Mills (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1946), 196-245.
13. Tocqueville, Democracy in America, 282.
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late nineteenth-century conceptual revolution in public finance was by the
early 1920s nearly complete. 1
4
After briefly summarizing the profound fiscal and administrative
changes wrought by the Great War, this article focuses on the government
attorneys who operated just below the main line of hierarchical authority
and well above the quotidian task of clerical staff. Among these lawyers,
some, like Daniel C. Roper, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, and
Thomas B. Love, an Assistant Treasury Secretary, were longtime southern
Democrats and Woodrow Wilson supporters who fit easily into the wartime
administration.' 5 Others seemed more out of place. The Wall Street
Republicans Russell C. Leffingwell and Arthur A. Ballantine were early
Treasury department consultants who quickly rose to more prominent pos-
itions. They were more emblematic of the elite corporate attorneys who
viewed the rise of the wartime fiscal state and their role in its emergence
with a combination of pride and consternation. This article chronicles
how lawyers like Leffingwell, Roper, Ballantine, and Love helped build
the wartime fiscal regime-a regime that did as much to meet the revenue
needs of the war as it did to reorient the meaning of progressive tax reform.
Wartime Statism, Fiscal Revolution, and the Infusion
of Administrative Resources
As part of the war mobilization effort, the federal government significantly
expanded its powers and reach over U.S. society. Overall federal spending,
for instance, skyrocketed from a paltry 0.2 percent of GDP in 1914 to
about 3.2 percent by 1919.16 Within months of U.S. entry into the war,
several new federal agencies were created, including the Food
Administration to regulate the price, production, and distribution of food-
stuffs; the National War Labor Board to manage industrial relations; and
14. David M. Kennedy, Freedom from Fear: The American People in Depression and
War, 1929-45 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); Brownlee, Federal Taxation in
America, 48-62; Steven A. Bank, Kirk J. Stark, Joseph J. Thomdike, eds., War and
Taxes (Washington, D.C.: Urban Institute Press, 2008), 49-52.
15. It should come as no surprise that attorneys working for President Woodrow Wilson-
the lawyer/scholar turned statesman who arguably did the most to advance the intellectual
campaign for the administrative state-were at the forefront of using tax laws and policies
to develop the administrative infrastructure of the modem state. Woodrow Wilson, The
State: Elements of Historical and Practical Politics: A Sketch of Institutional History and
Administration (Boston: D. C. Heath, 1889); John A. Thompson, "Woodrow Wilson and
a World Governed by Evolving Law," Journal of Policy History 20 (1) (2008): 113-25.
16. Historical Statistics of the United States: Earliest Times to the Present, ed. Susan
B. Carter et al. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), Table Ea 584-587,
Table Ca 9-19.
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most notably the War Industries Board, which under the leadership of the
financier Bernard Baruch attempted to coordinate and streamline the
military-industrial procurement process. In what was perhaps the most
intense form of government intervention in the economy, the Wilson
administration also took control of the railroads, pooling the various
lines to create an integrated, national system of transportation. By the
eve of the war, a form of U.S. corporatism was firmly in place, as "the fed-
eral government, the industrial community, and the military services had
developed complex, modem, and professionalized structures, each depen-
dent upon the others." 17 Brokering agreements between organized interests
became a defining aspect of the administration's broader mode of progress-
ive governance, and thus the role of Treasury lawyers as mediators between
competing interests fit naturally with the methods of wartime statecraft.18
To underwrite the unprecedented institutional interdependence between
state and society, the national tax system underwent its own transformation.
Federal taxation expanded during the early twentieth century with the cor-
porate excise tax of 1909, the ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment in
1913, and the enactment of a national income tax in that same year. But
it was not until the war that the federal government began to exercise assi-
duously its new taxing powers. 19 With high exemption levels and moder-
ately graduated rates, the early prewar versions of the federal income tax
affected only a small fraction of U.S. citizens and added little to the
national fisc. In fiscal year 1914, as the tariff and excise taxes continued
to dominate federal revenues, only about 2 percent of the labor force
paid income taxes, and income tax receipts, accordingly, made up fewer
than 10 percent of total federal revenues. 20
17. Paul A. C. Koistinen, Mobilizing for Modern War: The Political Economy of
American Warfare, 1865-1919 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas), 4.
18. Cuff, War Industries Board; Michael E. McGerr, A Fierce Discontent: The Rise and
Fall of the Progressive Movement in America, 1870-1920 (New York: Simon & Schuster,
2003), ch. 9.
19. Witte, Politics and Development of the Federal Income Tax, 79-87; Bmwnlee, Federal
Taxation in America, 47-58. On the early origins of the U.S. income tax, see Robert Stanley,
Dimensions of Law in the Service of Order: Origins of the Federal Income Tax, 1861-1913
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1993); Jerold L. Waltman, Political Origins of the U.S.
Income Tax (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 1985); Steven R. Weisman, The Great
Tax Wars: Lincoln to Wilson; the Fierce Battles over Money and Power that Transformed the
Nation (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002); Sidney Ratner, Taxation and Democracy in
America (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1942).
20. United States Treasury Department, Annual Report of the Secretary of the Treasury on
the State of the Finances for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1914 (Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1915), 149. The 1913 income tax had a $3,000 exemption
level for individuals and a $4,000 exemption for married couples, and it had graduated
rates that began with a 1 percent "normal" tax on all incomes above the exemption levels
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By the end of the war, however, levies on income and profits had
eclipsed all other forms of taxation. Marginal individual income tax rates
soared to a top figure of 77 percent, the percentage of the labor force
filing income taxes climbed to nearly 17 percent, and monies generated
by income and profits taxes accounted for roughly half of all federal
revenues in fiscal year 1919 (see Table 1). Although exemption levels
decreased substantially, the wartime tax system had a distinctive
"soak-the-rich" characteristic. In fact, the effective tax rate of the nation's
wealthiest 1 percent of households soared from roughly 3 percent in 1916
to 15 percent within two years.21
Taxes were not the only source of funding for the robust wartime state-
government borrowing and the use of newly created monetary powers were
also critical. Government bonds, artfully dubbed "Liberty Loans," provided
significant revenue. As a result, total public debt as a percentage of GDP
increased from 0.2 percent in 1914 to roughly 4.3 percent by 1919.22
Lenient monetary policy also provided a convenient, if unacknowledged,
source of financing. From June 1916 to June 1919, the money supply
increased by over $11 billion, and consumer prices shot up nearly 66 percent.
Although budget surpluses and a more stable money supply resurfaced
after the war, debt financing and rampant inflation proved to be key com-
ponents in the wartime mix of funding sources. In fact, economic historians
have estimated that the U.S. war effort was financed with roughly 20 percent
of taxes, 20 percent of money creation, and the remaining 60 percent from
public borrowing. Wartime government officials, especially the Treasury
lawyers, agonized over the distributional implications of these various
funding sources.23
and included "surtax" rates that ranged from an additional 1 to 6 percent, with the maximum
rate applied to incomes over $500,000 (Revenue Act of 1913, chap. 16, 38 Stat. 114, 166,
168).
21. Effective tax rates refer to the ratio of a taxpayer's tax liability to income. For those
few taxpayers who had annual incomes that exceeded $1 million the effective tax rate sky-
rocketed from 10 percent to over 70 percent between 1916 and 1918. W. Elliot Brownlee,
"Historical Perspectives on U.S. Tax Policy Toward the Rich," in Does Atlas Shrug? The
Economic Consequences of Taxing the Rich, ed. Joel B. Slemrod (New York: Russell
Sage Foundation, 2000), 45. Historical Statistics of the United States, Series Ea 758-772.
22. In nominal terms, the federal budget deficit climbed from roughly $400 million in
1914 to over $13 billion by 1919. Total public debt consequently soared from about $1 bil-
lion to over $25 billion during the same period (Historical Statistics of the United States,
Series Ea 584-587).
23. Gilbert, American Financing of WW/, 177-99, 212-13; Sparrow, From the Outside In,
298-302; Milton Friedman and Anna J. Schwartz, A Monetary History of the United States,
1867-1960 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1963), 189-239; Hugh Rockoff,
"Until its Over, Over There: The U.S. Economy in World War I," in The Economics of
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From a historical and comparative perspective, the economic impact of
U.S. war financing was mixed. On the one hand, the wartime fiscal policies
provided the American Expeditionary Forces and the Allies with sufficient
resources to win the war, and the World War I mix of financing sources
was an improvement from the Civil War when the North resorted mainly
to debt financing and the printing of new money. Yet, if one measures
the economic success of wartime financing by focusing on the state's
ability to extract tax revenue from a broad base of citizen/taxpayers
while limiting the costs of inflation, the U.S. financing of World War I
was not nearly as successful as World War II. During the latter conflict
taxes constituted a significantly larger percentage of financing, and
inflation was much lower mainly because of greater productivity and stable
rates of savings.
Comparatively, U.S. financing of the Great War was superior to nearly
all other major participants in the conflict. Only Great Britain, which
followed a similar path of relying on current taxation, was able to fund
roughly one-fifth of its war expenditures with taxes, though it suffered
from an increasing price level that exceeded U.S. inflation. France,
Russia, and Italy, by contrast, raised little from taxes and were forced to
rely on tremendous amounts of public borrowing and inflation-inducing
money creation, which greatly undermined their postwar credit and econ-
omies. This comparative success, in part, explains why World War I was
vital to the early development of U.S. geopolitical power.2 4
During the early stages of mobilization, lawmakers seemed intent on
financing the war evenly with current taxes and debt financing. Even before
the United States officially entered the conflict, the 1916 Revenue Act
demonstrated the federal govemment's resolve. It provided sharply higher
income tax rates, a tax on the business profits of munitions manufacturers,
and a graduated federal inheritance tax. Supported by progressive groups
like the American Committee on War Finance and the Association for
an Equitable Federal Income Tax, the new law had broad appeal, especially
since it came on the heels of the U.S. Supreme Court's validation of the
World War I, ed. Stephen Broadberry and Mark Harrison (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2005), 310-343.
24. Paul Studenski and Herman E. Krooss, Financial History of the United States: Fiscal,
Monetary, Banking, and Tariff, including Financial Administration and State and Local
Finance (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1963), 280-81. Gilbert, American Financing of WWI,
221-24; Edwin R. A. Seligman, Essays in Taxation (New York: McMillan Co., 1921),
757-67; Sparrow, From the Outside In, 295-302; Strachan, Financing the First World
War; Michael H. Hunt., The American Ascendancy: How the United States Gained and
Wielded Dominance (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007), chap. 2.
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1913 income tax-a decision that emboldened lawmakers to forcefully use
their new found fiscal powers. 25
As the war progressed, lawmakers sought to continue to minimize
borrowing to restrain inflation and spread the war costs fairly across
generations and between socioeconomic classes. In his war message to
Congress in 1917, President Wilson stated, "so far as practicable the bur-
den of the war should be borne by taxation of the present generation rather
than by loans." Treasury secretary McAdoo reiterated that "fifty percent of
the war costs should be financed by" taxation, contending that "one of the
most fatal mistakes that governments have made in all countries has been
the failure to impose fearlessly and promptly upon the existing generation a
fair burden of the cost of war."'26 The desire to balance the war costs with
an eye towards intergenerational equity illustrates how the Wilson admin-
istration was mindful of its social and ethical obligations to monitor the dis-
tributional effects of war financing. Leffingwell and his legal colleagues
echoed this initial message of seeking distributional equity, especially
when other Treasury department officials began to veer from this initial
commitment.
Although the 1916 law solidified the taxing powers of the national
government, the most radical departures-and certainly the most contro-
versial-came after the United States officially entered the war in April
1917. Initially, McAdoo anticipated that of the $3.5 billion needed for
the war new taxation could provide $1.8 billion. These optimistic projec-
tions were soon dashed, however. By the summer of 1917, war costs
were expected to be closer to $15 billion, with taxation making up less
than $2 billion. "With each fresh calculation," McAdoo later disparagingly
recalled, "the sum had grown larger, and the figures were appalling. There
25. Revenue Act of 1916, 39 Stat.' 767 (1916); W. Elliot Brownlee, "Wilson and Financing
the Modem State: The Revenue Act of 1916," Proceedings of the American Philosophical
Society 129 (2) (1985): 173-205; Roy G. Blakey and Gladys C. Blakey, The Federal Income
Tax (New York: Longmans, Green, 1940), chap. 4; Brushaber v. Union Pacific Railroad
Co., 240 U.S. 1 (1916). The munitions tax, in particular, was a rifle-shot provision aimed
squarely at the E. I. du Pont de Nemours Company also known as the "Powder Trust"
because it was the leading maker of gun powder and military explosives. In 1916, roughly
90 percent of the revenues from the munitions tax came from the Du Pont Company (Stuart
D. Brandes, Warhogs: A History of War Profits in America [Lexington: University of
Kentucky Press, 1997], 135).
26. "McAdoo Talks Over Loan at Lunch with Bankers," Wall Street Journal, May 5,
1917; William G. McAdoo, Crowded Years: The Reminiscences of William G. McAdoo
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1931), 389-90; Dale N. Shook, William G. McAdoo and the
Development of National Economic Policy, 1913-1918 (New York: Garland, 1987),
263-64; Gilbert, American Financing of WW1, 84.
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were so many uncertain factors in the problem that a definite conclusion
was not possible."27
As Treasury confronted the mounting war costs, and U.S. troops began
sailing overseas, the calls for confiscatory taxes on income, profits, and
wealth became more vociferous. Demands for the "conscription of wealth"
to match the conscription of men began to fill the editorial pages of the
country's leading publications. While Congress debated a new tax bill,
newspapers like the Los Angeles Times rhetorically queried whether the
minor financial sacrifices made by the Rockefellers and the Fords could
compare "with that of the man who bares his breast to the bullets or the
bayonets of the foe and risks his life for his country. What are the sacrifices
of capitalists compared with the sacrifices of those whom the solider leaves
behind?" 28
The 1917 Revenue Act thus dramatically raised the stakes. It increased
the top individual marginal tax rates to unprecedented heights, enacted sev-
eral nominal excise taxes, and adopted a new controversial levy on excess
profits. Whereas the earlier munitions-profits tax levied a flat 12.5 percent
tax on the profits of all armament producers, the newly created
excess-profits tax applied to profits "over a reasonable return on invested
capital," and affected all businesses, not just those in the munitions
industry. 29
Other nations used excess-profits taxes as a funding source, but the
unprecedented turn to this levy by the United States signaled the Wilson
administration's desire to alter the concept and meaning of business
profits, at least during the war. Profits were no longer simply the gains
earned by private effort. As the language of the levy indicated, the notion
of taxing "excess" profits suggested that the broader public, through the
powers of the state, had a stake in the surplus of "unreasonable" or "abnor-
mal" business earnings created by war-those windfall gains that exceeded
a legitimate amount of financial profit. At a time when ordinary Americans
were sacrificing life and limb, the enactment of an excess-profits tax
expressed a growing indignation with war profiteering and a demand for
shared sacrifice that was at the center of the Treasury department's egali-
tarian sense of fiscal citizenship. The new valence of profits did not escape
27. McAdoo, Crowded Years, 372; Kennedy, Over Here, 107, 109.
28. "Conscripting Capital," Los Angeles Times, June 4, 1917, 114; "Where the Burden
Shall Fall," Puck, April 21, 1917, A7; "The Conscription of Wealth," The Independent,
April 28, 1917, 193.
29. Eight percent was established as the "reasonable rate of return," and all profits above
that level were taxed at graduated rates ranging from 8 percent to a maximum of 60 percent
on corporate profits that were in excess of 32 percent of invested capital (Revenue Act of
1917, 40 Stat. 300 [1917]).
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the notice of populist leaders and progressive lawmakers who strongly
supported the new levy, nor those conservatives who opposed it.30
The 1917 law also significantly raised taxes on alcohol, tobacco, and
wealth transfers, in addition to enacting a variety of excise taxes on luxury
items, sporting goods, and even chewing gum and movie tickets-all in
the hopes of symbolically, if not substantively, spreading the burden of war-
time fiscal sacrifice. Even before the 1917 tax law was enacted, the New York
lawyer Amos Pinchot boldly and presciently proclaimed: "If we ever get a
big income tax on in war time, some if it-a lot of it-is going to stick.''3'
To help make this new tax stick, the Treasury department itself under-
went a major reorganization. Several new assistant secretary positions
were created and the number of rank-and-file personnel expanded signifi-
cantly. Leffingwell occupied one of the new positions, and he and Roper
helped monitor the recruitment and training of Treasury personnel. The
Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), the unit responsible for interpreting,
assessing, and collecting taxes, including the excess-profits levy, grew
enormously under Roper's leadership. Between 1913 and 1920, the num-
ber of BIR personnel increased by nearly four-fold, rising from roughly
4,000 employees to nearly 16,000. Though that figure declined after the
war, the new plateau remained multiples above the prewar amount, thus
giving credence to the notion that the war had a ratchet effect on the
BIR's administrative capacity (see Fig. 1).32
Treasury department spending during and after the war mirrored the
increase in employment. Not only did the department's overall budget,
in real terms (constant 1913 dollars), more than double, increasing from
$86 million in 1915 to $187 million by 1919, such spending remained rela-
tively consistent after the war. During the same period, the BIR's specific
budget (in real terms) increased at an even greater pace, with spending
rising from just under $7 million to over $19 million, nearly a three-fold
increase. These figures illustrate the financial commitments to administra-
tive power required by the war. 33
30. "The Excess Profits Tax-Discussion," American Economic Review, 10 (March
1920): 19-32; Brownlee, "Economists and the Formation of the Modem Tax System in
the United States," in The State and Economic Knowledge, eds. Mary 0. Furner and
Barry Supple, 409-11; Brownlee, "State and Social Investigation," 328-32.
31. Revenue Act of 1917, 40 Stat. 300 (1917); Pinchot quoted in John W. Hilije,
"New York Progressivism and the War Revenue Act of 1917," New York History 53
(October 1972): 446.
32. Blakey and Blakey, Federal Income Tax, 540, Table 32; Alan T. Peacock and Jack
Wiseman, The Growth of Public Expenditure in the United Kingdom, 1890-1955
(London: Allen & Irwin, 1967); Sparrow, From the Outside In.
33. Annual Report of the Secretary of the Treasury, 1914-1925; Sparrow, From the
Outside In, 295-98; Historical Statistics of the United States, Table Cc 1-2.
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Figure 1. Growth of Bureau of Internal Revenue, 1915-1925. Source: Blakey and
Blakey, Federal Income Tax, 540, Table 32; Annual Reports of the Treasury
Department, 1914-1926.
In sum, World War I triggered a sea change in the historical develop-
ment of a powerful U.S. nation-state. Unparalleled interconnections
among economy, society, and polity were undergirded by fundamental
transformations in public finance and federal bureaucratic capacity. After
the war, the steeply progressive tax rates were scaled back, just as tariff
revenues increased in response to the revival of international trade. But
the national tax system did not return to either its prewar levels or even
its prewar trajectory-the war was thus the pivot upon which the early
twentieth-century fiscal revolution turned. Nonetheless, these profound
changes were not inexorable or predetermined. The years surrounding
the war were a highly charged period of contestation and contingency
regarding state authority. Not only did the possibility of U.S. participation
in the war divide the nation, once the United States became directly
involved, the exigencies and pragmatic demands of the conflict
frequently overwhelmed the initial desires and intentions of lawmakers
and administrative bureaucrats like the Treasury lawyers.
The Treasury Lawyers
It was amid the dramatic wartime changes in state power that the Treasury
lawyers made their mark. McAdoo, who himself had been a practicing
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lawyer before turning to other pursuits, filled key Treasury posts with lead-
ing members of the bar, often ones he knew personally. Roper and Love,
for example, were longtime southern Democrats. A former South Carolina
lawyer and state legislator, Roper had been a staff member at numerous
government commissions and agencies, and he was among the first
group of modem state officials to assemble the revolving door between
the public and private sector.34 Love, a former Texas legislator and insur-
ance lawyer, was appointed to his Treasury post mainly because of his role
as the head of Wilson's Texas reelection campaign. Throughout his career,
including during his tenure in Treasury, Love seemed more interested in
the partisanship of Democratic politics than the intricacies of insurance
law or government service. 35
If Roper and Love revealed the southern Democratic roots of the Wilson
administration, Leffingwell and Ballantine were the epitome of Yankee
aristocracy. Leffingwell was undoubtedly the central node in this network
of government attorneys. A graduate of Yale College and Columbia Law
School, and a former partner in the prestigious New York firm of
Cravath & Henderson, he was the de facto undersecretary of the
Treasury during most of the war.3 6 As a legal adviser for many of
New York's leading banks, Leffingwell had supervised numerous complex
corporate reorganizations before the war, and he had navigated the issuance
of some of the most challenging corporate and municipal securities offer-
ings. 37 Paul Cravath, his senior law partner, referred to Leffingwell as "one
of the best lawyers at our Bar, with no superior as a contract lawyer. '38
34. After working for the Interstate Commerce Commission in the 1890s, Roper leveraged his
regulatory knowledge and experience and became the manager of a railway and public utilities
financing firm. Daniel C. Roper, Fifty Years of Public Life (Durham, N.C.: Duke University
Press, 1941), 90-91. "The Public Service Record of Daniel C. Roper," Box 11: Honorary
Bound Volume, March 31, 1920, Daniel C. Roper Papers, Rare Book, Manuscript & Special
Collections Library, Duke University, Durham, N.C. (hereinafter DCRP).
35. "New Treasury Assistant," The Washington Post, December 11, 1917; Lewis L. Gould,
Progressives and Prohibitionists: Texas Democrats in the Wilson Era (Austin: University of
Texas Press, 1973), 61-62, 278-79; McAdoo, Crowded Years, 403; Sue E. Winton Moore,
Thomas B. Love, Texas Democrat, 1901-1949 (Master's thesis, University of Texas, 1971).
36. Leffingwell was not only a central legal figure in the development of Treasury policies
but he was also a capacious note-taker and correspondent who left behind an abundant col-
lection of documents, as perhaps only a former Cravath partner could. Russell C. Leffingwell
Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. (hereinafter RCLP).
37. Leffingwell was instrumental in assisting the investment house of Kuhn, Loeb & Co.
float $60 million worth of short-term debt for the Pennsylvania Railroad just as the Panic of
1907 had hit (Robert T. Swaine, The Cravath Firm and Its Predecessors, 1819-1947, 3 vol.
[New York: Ad Press, 1946], 1:716).
38. Stephen A. Schuker, "Leffingwell, Russell Comell," in Dictionary of American
Biography, Supplement 6, 1956-1960, ed. John A. Garraty (New York: Charles
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Like Leffingwell, Ballantine emerged from the ranks of the northeastern
legal elite. Educated at Harvard College and Law School, he became a
leading Boston corporate lawyer, specializing in bankruptcy reorganiza-
tions and corporate finance. At the start of the war, he was a temporary
consultant on the BIR's "committee of lawyers," but he soon became soli-
citor of Internal Revenue, the Bureau's chief lawyer, where he played
a central role in organizing the tax collection process and defending the
constitutionality of the excess-profits tax.
39
These Treasury lawyers generally entered government service in pre-
dictable ways. While Love and Roper, as longtime Wilson supporters,
were rewarded with their high-level positions because of years of loyal
service to the party, Leffingwell and Ballantine were appointed because
of their practical expertise and experience. Despite their similar back-
grounds, Leffingwell and Ballantine became "dollar-a-year" men through
different means..The Leffingwell family had social ties to the McAdoos,
but it was Paul Cravath who brought Leffingwell to McAdoo's atten-
tion.40 By contrast, Ballantine entered the wartime corporatist state
through a more conventional route. He likely came to the attention of
administration officials because of his progressive stance on the use of
Scribner's Sons, 1990), 376-78; W. Elliot Brownlee, "Russell Cornell Leffingwell," in
Encyclopedia of American Business History and Biography, Banking and Finance to
1913, ed. Larry Schweikart (New York: Facts on File, 1990), 216-39; Selected Letters of
R. C. Leffingwell, ed. Edward Pulling (Oyster Bay, N.Y.: Pulling, 1979), 3-5; Paul
Cravath to William G. McAdoo, May 4, 1917, Russell C. Leffingwell Papers, Series
I. Correspondence, Box 6, Folder 119, Sterling Memorial Library, Yale University, New
Haven, Conn.
39. "Arthur Ballantine, Lawyer, Dies," New York Times, October 12, 1960; "Hoover Aid
in Treasury Dies in N.Y." Washington Post, October 12, 1960; Melvin I. Urofsky,
"Ballantine, Arthur Atwood," in Dictionary of American Biography, Supplement Six,
1956-1960, ed. John A. Garraty (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1990), 3-4.
"Named Legal Advisors on War Revenue Regulations," Official Bulletin, December 1,
1917; Arthur A. Ballantine to Daniel C. Roper, November 25, 1918, Box 1: IRS Solicitor
1917-1919, Arthur A. Ballantine Papers, Herbert Hoover Presidential Library, West
Branch, Iowa (hereinafter ABP); Roper, Fifty Years, 174.
40. Brownlee, "Russell Cornell Leffingwell." According to Robert Swaine, when the
United States officially entered the war, Leffingwell demonstrated his patriotism-and per-
haps his disillusionment with his successful legal career-by joining the Plattsburg
Reserve Officers' Training Camp. Cravath was astonished to learn about his junior law
partner's seemingly rash decision, and he intervened to ensure that Leffingwell's expertise
in legal and financial matters would not be wasted on the battlefield. Cravath contended
that Leffingwell with his age and experience could provide the country with greater service
in Washington than by "toting a gun, doing K.P., or teaching American young men how
to stick their bayonets through the bodies of imaginary Huns" (Swaine, Cravath Firm,
209).
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insurance, rather than traditional tort suits, to compensate victims of rail-
way injuries.4 1
Leffingwell and his colleagues wielded significant private and public
power at a time when the U.S. legal profession itself was undergoing dra-
matic change. The Great War began during the tail end of the transition
from what the legal historian Robert W. Gordon has dubbed "liberal legal
science" to "progressive legal science." By the start of the war, elite lawyers
were less concerned about policing the boundaries between public and
private power than they were about using their professional contacts
and technical expertise to develop efficient solutions to social conflicts.
As the elite practice of law expanded beyond common-law courts and into
the boardrooms and corridors of large corporations, lawyers became more
than just zealous trial advocates of their clients' interests; they also became
pivotal mediators and negotiators seeking to broker big deals and execute
complex transactions that affected a variety of interests. 42
The structure of law firms at this time was also undergoing an organiza-
tional transformation. Since the turn of the century, leading lawyers had
been assisting large industrial clients in vertically integrating their businesses
and consolidating their hold over particular industries, just as lawyers them-
selves hastened their professional project of controlling the market for legal
services. 43 As part of the corporate reconstruction of U.S. capitalism, law
firms abandoned the model of small general partnerships independent of
their clients' hierarchical management. They embraced, instead, the model
of a large, multispecialist law office pioneered by the New York Cravath
firm. Only such large, compartmentalized firms could service the enormous
and complex bankruptcy reorganizations, corporate mergers and acqui-
sitions, and securities issuances that became critical components in the
broader structural transformation of the U.S. economy.44
41. Arthur A. Ballantine, "A Compensation Plan for Railway Accident Claims," Harvard
Law Review 29 (7) (May 1916); "Modernizing Railway Accident Law," The Outlook,
November 15, 1916.
42. Gordon, "Legal Thought"; Gordon, "The American Legal Profession, 1870-2000," in
The Cambridge History of Law in America, eds. Grossberg and Tomlins, 92-98; Hurst,
Growth of American Law; Hofstadter, Age of Reform.
43. Margali Sarfatti Larson, The Rise of Professionalism: A Sociological Analysis
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), chap. 9; Abel, American Lawyers.
44. Martin J. Sklar, The Corporate Reconstruction of American Capitalism, 1890-1916:
The Market, the Law, and Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988); Alfred
D. Chandler Jr. The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977); Louis Galambos, Competition and
Cooperation: The Emergence of a National Trade Association (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1966); Vicky Saker Woeste, The Farmer's Benevolent Trust: Law and
Agricultural Cooperation in Industrial America, 1865-1945 (Chapel Hill: University of
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The Treasury lawyers embodied the new vision of the highly skilled
transactional attorney as essential intermediary. In this sense, this history
of the World War I Treasury lawyers is less a story about the power and
personalities of individual policymakers-though their personalities
undoubtedly played a part in shaping their decisions and actions-than it
is a tale about how a group of early twentieth-century U.S. lawyers and
their particular professional perspective shaped the emerging institutional
contours of a new fiscal order; how their networks, skills, and experience,
in other words, reflected a historically specific professional mind-set
about the broad role of lawyers in building a modem, liberal polity.
As Leffingwell observed toward the end of his career, the main role of
his generation of lawyers was not to be merely a specialist in any one
area of legal practice, but to be, as he put it, the "doctor who knew
when to call in the specialist. '45
In their role as legal doctors to the Treasury Department, Leffingwell
and his colleagues deployed a type of general analysis and problem-solving
ability to provide systematic, forward-looking, long-term solutions. They
used a broad and holistic perspective to build the department's organiza-
tional capacity, to formulate fiscal policy options, to search for alternative
sources of revenue, and to evaluate the distributional impact of the new tax
laws and policies. To accomplish these tasks, these legal professionals
understood that they needed to create a core institutional culture committed
to gaining the public trust. Given the department's historical lack of
administrative capacity and inability to build public faith in its earlier
use of monetary policy, World War I tax policy afforded the department
a new opportunity to gain the confidence and support of the populace.46
The Treasury lawyers seized this opportunity. They used the skills
of cooperation and negotiation, developed as part of their prewar transac-
tional practices, in their government service. As Roper recounted in his
memoirs, his main goal in running the BIR was to cultivate a collaborative
relationship between the BIR and taxpayers. "With the Government in part-
nership with business, it was increasingly important that the partners
co-operate for their common good and not antagonize each other," he
North Carolina Press, 1998); Swaine, Cravath Firm; Gordon, "The American Legal
Profession."
45. R. C. Leffingwell, "Comments on the Proposal," Journal of Public Law 5 (1955): 5.
46. James Q. Wilson, Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It
(New York: Basic, 1989), 370-73; Gretchen Ritter, Goldbugs and Greenbacks: The
Antimonopoly Tradition and the Politics of Finance in America (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1997), 175; Richard Bensel, Yankee Leviathan, The Origins of Central
State Authority in America 1859-1877 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990),
chap. 4; Carpenter, Forging Bureaucratic Autonomy, 60-63.
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recalled. The exigencies of the war emergency, of course, forced U.S. citizens
to relax, at least temporarily, their long-held skepticism of centralized power,
thus limiting antagonisms. But Roper and his colleagues were well aware that
they could not squander the tolerance afforded by the crisis. Winning the
war and making the world safe for democracy meant creating confidence
and legitimacy in the fairness and effectiveness of wartime fiscal policies.47
Recruiting, Training, and a Common Commitment
to Building Public Trust
For the Treasury lawyers, one way to build public trust was by recruiting and
hiring like-minded colleagues who embraced the department's core mission of
cooperating with citizens and taxpayers in raising revenue. Developing a
homogeneous cadre of officials and staff was a challenge, especially given
the initial social divisions over the war, Treasury's growing size, and the allure
of a prosperous wartime economy. Nonetheless, administrators like
Leffingwell and Roper tapped their social and professional contacts to hire
assistants who shared their vision of-and their professional biases toward-
corporatist state building. Leffingwell naturally turned to the Cravath firm. He
not only recruited several of his key lieutenants from the firm, including Hugh
Satterlee and S. Parker Gilbert, a well-regarded corporate attorney who suc-
ceeded Lefflngwell as undersecretary, but he also "tumed the tables" on
Paul Cravath, volunteering the services of his senior partner to assist the
U.S. representatives to the Inter-Allied Conference in Europe.48
Likewise, Roper assembled his "cabinet" of assistants by hiring friends
and associates from his days in the Post Office Department, the Tariff
Commission, and the Ways and Means Committee. With his experience
shuttling between govemment and private service, Roper also anticipated
the future benefits that could inure to those who were willing to help
usher in a new fiscal order. As the leading tax lawyers E. Barrett
Prettyman Sr. and Albert L. Hopkins later recalled, Roper recruited
young, struggling attorneys, and some of Washington's first "lady law-
yers," with appeals to patriotism and remarks about how "this tax business
is likely to develop into quite a thing for lawyers."'49
47. Roper, Fifty Years, 177, 193.
48. Swaine, Cravath Finn, 210; Lawrence L. Murray, "Bureaucracy and Bipartisanship in
Taxation: The Mellon Plan Revisited," Business History Review 52 (Summer 1978): 200-25.
49. Roper, Fifty Years, 174-75; "Robert Miller, U.S. Tax Lawyer Under Woodrow
Wilson, Is Dead," New York Times, January 2, 1968, 41; Albert L. Hopkins,
Autobiography of a Lawyer (Chicago, 1966), 106; E. Barrett Prettyman, "Autobiography
of a an Obscure Man at Forty," unpublished manuscript in Box 122, E. Barrett Prettyman
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With their vast professional and social network reaching the worlds of
law, banking, insurance, and accounting, the lawyers-turned-administrators
quickly became pivotal intermediaries between the burgeoning fiscal state
and the business community. Indeed, because they were central nodes in an
elite network, the lawyers could consult with a variety of interests and
recruit like-minded legal professionals, with similar contacts and commit-
ments to building public trust. Other professionals within the Treasury
Department may have been able to staff and train officials, but only law-
yers could reach out to those who had experience interacting with, and
building confidence among, a variety of financial and regulatory actors.
Leffingwell regularly consulted former colleagues and clients to test
ideas about fiscal policy, to gauge private perceptions of government
actions, and to develop a dialogue about the ongoing relationship among
taxpayers, bond investors, and the Treasury Department. Some of these
contacts, in turn, did not hesitate in soliciting Leffingwell's influence in
their own personal tax matters with the BIR.50
Meanwhile, Roper developed his own cooperative methods. At the start
of the war, he created several advisory boards and a "committee of attor-
neys," which initially included Ballantine, to "review from time to time
the decisions of the legal forces of the Bureau" and to "arouse a public
consciousness of the partnership relation" formed by the new wartime
tax laws. This "public consciousness" was necessary, Roper concluded,
"if we were to achieve cooperation between the Government and the tax-
payers in administering the law with justice and equity."'5'
Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. I am grateful to Dan Ernst for identifying the
Prettyman manuscript and its relevance to my research. Many Treasury lawyers went on to
have prosperous postwar tax law careers, including Prettyman, Hopkins, Robert N. Miller,
and Annabel Matthews, one of the few female attorneys working in Ballantine's office'
Matthews began her career as a clerk in the BIR in 1914, worked her way up to become
a senior attorney, and then became the first female judge on the U.S. Board of Tax
Appeals in 1930 ("Miss Matthews, U.S. Tax Expert," Washington Post, March 25, 1960);
see also the appointment and promotion letters contained in "Folder 11: Correspondence,
1914-1930," Annabel Matthews Papers, 1880-1960, Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe
Institute, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.
50. Leffingwell to Thomas W. Lamont Jr. (Officer of J. P. Morgan & Co.), February 21,
1918, Reel 3; Leffingwell to Otto Kahn (Member of Kahn, Loeb investment banking house),
June 10, 1918, Reel 5; Leffingwell to Goldman, Sachs & Co., July 8, 1918, Reel 9, RCLP;
Leffingwell to George 0. May (Senior Partner, Price Waterhouse & Co.), August 12, 1918,
Reel 10, RCLP. Brownlee, "Russell Cornell Leffingwell," 217. On Leffingwell's assistance
to friends and former colleagues see, Leffingwell to W. M. Cutcheon (of Cravath), December
1917, Reel 1; Leffingwell to Love, January 23, 1918, Reel 2, RCLP.
51. "D.C. Bank Merges Foreign Branches: Roper Names Advisors," Washington Post,
April 3, 1918, 5; Roper, Fifty Years, 174; Roper, "The War Revenue Act and the
Taxpayer," 2, December 13, 1917, Box 27: Addresses, DCRP. As a political insider,
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Professional loyalty, the promise of future riches, and patriotic appeals
helped the Treasury lawyers recruit close confidants, but the staffing of
clerical personnel posed other challenges. Although the total number
of personnel hired by the Treasury Department increased sharply throughout
the war, conscription and increasing private-sector demands reduced the
pool of available staff members and tarnished the image of government
work. Maintaining the continuity of personnel and bolstering staff morale
were critical for public confidence. When there was talk in the summer of
1918 that the draft age would be lowered, Leffingwell feared that the depart-
ment's personnel would be decimated. Revealing perhaps his own anxieties
about the decision not to enlist in the military, Leffingwell warned McAdoo
that "the efficiency of this Department and the Liberty Loan organization is
in danger of being undermined as a result of the proposed extension of the
draft age." Since Leffingwell himself "was on the way to being a soldier
when [McAdoo] drafted him into the Treasury," he could empathize with
those staffers who longed for more active participation in the war. "These
men would gladly enough be fighting instead of figuring," wrote
Leffingwell. "We are only keeping them on their present jobs because they
feel they are doing the work they are best fitted for to help win the war."'52
Roper went further in using patriotism to link figuring and fighting.
"While our soldiers and sailors pay the full price," he told his BIR field
agents, "you will be giving your vigilant, unselfish and indefatigable
service with quick understanding and keen enthusiasm to keeping open
the life stream of revenue that finances the nation in both peace and war.
And let no man lack the knowledge of just how the paying of his tax is
a part of the winning of the war."'53
As the war progressed, the training of new department hires became
increasingly important to the mission of building a coherent and cohesive
institutional culture. To be sure, the Treasury lawyers underwent their own
leaming by fire. Roper and Ballantine struggled to create a rational collec-
tion process that could make sense of the new profits taxes. Love, working
closely with Leffingwell, learned firsthand about the exacting demands of
the "Cravath system," as he became the junior partner in Leffingwell's own
Roper was also consistently fielding requests for assistance in helping politicians land gov-
ernment jobs for their friends and constituents. Breckinridge Long (Third Assistant Secretary
of State) to Daniel C. Roper, February 28, 1920, Box 11, DCRP.
52. Leffingwell to McAdoo, August 17, 1918, Reel 10, RCLP; "1,500,000 for France,"
Washington Post, April 4, 1918, 2.
53. Roper, Fifty Years, 183; BIR field agents responded in kind to the confidence that
Roper had instilled in them, and they understood that by following Roper their postwar
careers "will be more remunerative and less exacting" (A. S. Walker to Daniel C. Roper,
March 27, 1920, Box 11, DCRP).
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public finance practice, frequently enduring the stem rebukes of his
professional superior.54
But developing the core commitment of building public trust also meant
retaining and inculcating a group of highly trained staffers. No sooner
had new assistants and clerks been hired and trained, than the private sector
frequently lured many away. "The complex character" of the new tax laws,
Roper explained, unexpectedly led to a "drain upon our best men," with
businesses "continually skimming the cream of our trained men from
our organization" in order to comply with the new laws and regulations.
"As man after man left to accept financial beguilement, the condition
gave cause for alarm." In response to this "exodus of trained personnel,"
Roper, ever the pragmatic institutional entrepreneur, consulted with his
"Little Cabinet" to develop a-"training school" for BIR personnel on the
fundamentals of tax law and accounting. Homer S. Pace, a well-known
New York accountant, became the night school's supervisor, and the
heads of the different BIR divisions became his "professors." 55
The recruitment, retention, and training of highly skilled professionals
appeared to pay dividends. Some wealthy individuals and businesses
protested the reach of the new tax laws, but these complaints were often
muffled by the patriotic pressures of the war and by the Treasury depart-
ment's image of effective and fair administration. Roper, for instance,
nostalgically, and perhaps exaggeratedly, recounted how the BIR's advi-
sory groups and committees had convinced disgruntled taxpayers of the
accuracy and effectiveness of the tax assessment process. The focus on
building public trust flowed throughout the Treasury. "The problem of
statesmanship," McAdoo once explained, "is to establish a just relation
between necessary taxation and the earning power of the Nation. '56
Leffingwell admired how McAdoo had "managed to make himself an
advocate of huge taxes without antagonizing" citizens, and how he had
"on the contrary gained the confidence of the taxpayers," especially
business interests. McAdoo accomplished all this, Leffingwell concluded,
54. Unsurprisingly, Love's patience for being the direct subordinate to a New York
Republican and Cravath partner eventually wore thin, as he quickly returned to the comforts
of Texas Democratic politics soon after the war (More, Thomas Love; "Excess Tax Review
Board," Wall Street Journal, April 3, 1918).
55. Roper, Fifty Years, 181; Lillian Doris, The American Way in Taxation: Internal
Revenue, 1862-1963 (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963), 218. Roper set up
similar training for BIR field offices. Roper, "The War Revenue Act and the Taxpayer,"
3, DCRP.
56. McAdoo to Kitchin, June 5, 1918, Record Group 56-General Records of the Office
of the Secretary of the Treasury, Box 187, Folder "Tax-Excess Profits & War Profits,
1917-1920." National Archives and Record Administration, College Park, Md. (hereinafter
NARA Excess Profits Tax Folder).
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because the Treasury Department was careful to distance itself "from the
ignorant or malicious corporation-baiting" that other federal agencies
"habitually practiced." 57
Administrative Capacity and the Image of a Rational Executive Agency
Developing a cooperative, corporatist relationship between state and society
was crucial to the Treasury Department's institutional mission of building
public trust. So too was the creation of administrative capacity. If "figuring"
rather than "fighting" was what Treasury personnel could do to help win
the war, the lawyers wanted to make sure that the department had all the
administrative power that it needed. Treasury therefore, first, needed to estab-
lish and guard its jurisdictional prerogatives, especially since war mobiliz-
ation created numerous government organizations that frequently blurred
the institutional lines of control. In the process, the department needed to pro-
ject the image, if not the reality, of an agency that was imposing rationality
onto the uncertainty of war financing.
To do this, Treasury lawyers used their professional contacts and legal
skills to protect the scope of their administrative powers. They defended
their authority over fiscal policy by rebuking other, often newly created,
federal entities such as the Capital Issues Committee (CIC)--the organiza-
tion created as part of the War Finance Corporation (WFC) to filter and
supervise the flow of capital to private businesses. When the CIC
attempted to regulate bank loans, Treasury lawyers relied on their skills
of statutory interpretation to quash what they saw as an encroachment
onto their powers. "I think it would be bad organization and contrary to
the spirit, if not the letter of the Act under which the Capital Issues
Committee was formed, for it to interfere in any way with bank loans,"
Leffingwell notified McAdoo. 58 Similarly, when some states attempted
creatively to tax the interest on federal government securities---contrary
to the law-the Treasury department unleashed its powers and those of
the Justice Department and the Federal Reserve System to remind state
tax officials to adhere to the details of federal law. Treasury's legal staff
also drafted legislation, coaxed lawmakers, and considered new rules
57. "Excess Tax Review Board," Wall Street Journal, April 3, 1918; Roper, Fifty Years,
175. Leffingwell to George R. Cooksey (Assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury), August
23, 1918, Reel 11, RCLP.
58. Leffingwell to McAdoo, August 24, 1918, Reel 11, RCLP; Eisner, From Warfare
State to Welfare State, 230-31. Leffingwell took similar steps to ensure that the War
Finance Corporation did not also directly take part in financing the war effort
(Leffingwell to Thomas V. Lamont [Partner, J. P. Morgan & Co.], February 21, 1918,
Reel 3, RCLP).
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that would contain the autonomous powers of state governments within the
structures of U.S. federalism. In curbing the powers of other war agencies
and state governments, Treasury consolidated its own powers by clearly
delimiting the authority of competing organizations. 59
The different bureaus within the Treasury themselves frequently clashed
over the exercise of administrative power, particularly when it came to com-
municating with the taxpaying public. A correspondence between Ballantine
and Leffingwell revealed concerns over who had proper jurisdiction to issue
Treasury regulations related to tax collection. Leffingwell contended that it
was Treasury secretary McAdoo and not his subordinate, the Commissioner
of Internal Revenue Roper, who was ultimately responsible for accepting
Treasury certificates as payment for income and profits taxes. He sternly
informed Ballantine that "the public debt and public monies are matters
which do not concern the Commissioner; and investors.., will be reassured
by reading that the regulations are to be prescribed by the same authority
which issues them." In his typically self-assured style, Leffingwell even
provided Ballantine with detailed legislative language illustrating his point.60
Maintaining jurisdictional control was not only an issue of power, how-
ever. It was also a matter of establishing the perceived legal transparency,
stability, and predictability that were critical to broadcasting the impression
of an organized and coherent executive agency. At times, this meant that
the Treasury lawyers were willing to use their legal and financial expertise
to help taxpayers execute unique and complex commercial transactions,
such as when Henry Ford bought out the minority shareholders of the
Ford Motor Company in 1919. This transaction, as Roper later recalled,
proved to be "an exceptional opportunity" for the BIR to provide the tax
guidance that effectuated the buyouts, yielded substantial tax revenue,
and garnered the trust of the business community.6 1
Besides such special cases, the Treasury lawyers understood that to impose
rationality onto the uncertainty of war financing they needed to control the
flow of public information. Information, as the lawyers knew, was vital to
the effective functioning of capital markets and the overall revenue-raising
59. Leffingwell to Attorney General Thomas W. Gregory, March 23, 1918; Leffingwell to
Gregory, October 14, 1918; Leffingwell to Gregory, December 1918; Leffingwell to Senator
Robert L. Owen, March 26, 1918; Leffingwell to McAdoo, December 1917; Leffingwell to
Congressman Carter Glass, January 16, 1918; Leffingwell to Richmond Weed, September 3,
1918, RCLP. For more on the importance of delimitation for bureaucratic power, see Weber,
"Bureaucracy."
60. Leffingwell to Ballantine, October 25, 1918, Reel 16, RCLP.
61. "Fords Acquire Stock Control in their Company," New York Times, July 12, 1919, 1;
Roper, Fifty Years, 181-82; Douglas Brinkley, Wheels for the World: Henry Ford, His
Company, and a Century of Progress, 1903-2003 (New York: Viking, 2003), 240-42.
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process. In reality, controlling information to project a judicious image was
frequently less about increased transparency than it was about carefully cul-
tivating public perceptions. To this end, Leffingwell kept an incredibly
tight personal grip over public access to government information. He was
quick to admonish his bureau chiefs for press leaks. He often edited the
official press releases issued by the department. And he regularly read the
New York and Washington papers to review how they were covering war
financing, and to gauge how editors were responding to new policies. 62
The Treasury lawyers also shaped public perceptions in other ways.
Thomas Love, at McAdoo's behest, tapped his Texas contacts and used
his skills as a political operative to campaign for Liberty Loans. Roper,
as we have seen, used the BIR's advisory boards and ad hoc committees
to convince taxpayers of the effectiveness and fairness of tax assessments.
In a rare moment of self-congratulation, even Leffingwell acknowledged
how Treasury's proficient administration of war financing had enhanced
public confidence in the department. After learning, in the fall of 1918,
that the press and investors had favorably received the fourth and largest
Liberty Loan distribution, he wrote to McAdoo that we "have undertaken
stupendous tasks and imposed heavy burdens but heretofore without arous-
ing antagonism or controversy. Now more than ever we need to make the
people feel that the great machine is running smoothly. '63
In some ways, controlling the flow of public information did not appear
to be a task that required the skills of professional corporate lawyers. After
all, George Creel's Committee on Public Information was already carefully
managing U.S. public opinion, often with propaganda evoking chilling and
dangerous images of foreign invaders. 64 But unlike the Americanization
62. Leffingwell to McAdoo, September 11, 1918; Leffingwell to Thomas Love, July 19,
1918; Leffingwell to McAdoo, August 17, 1918; "For Morning Papers," (Leffingwell
approved press release regarding recent issuance of Treasury certificates) September 12,
1918; Leffingwell to John Burke (Treasurer of the United States), December 3, 1917;
Leffingwell to McAdoo, January 16, 1918, Reel 1, RCLP.
63. Leffingwell to McAdoo, September 11, 1918, Reel 12, RCLP; Schafer, America in the
Great War, chap. 1. Treasury officials also worked with George Creel's Committee on
Public Information (CPI) to spotlight the fiscal obligations of buying liberty loans and to
cajole Americans to do their Christmas shopping early to expedite the receipt of federal
sales taxes. George Creel to Woodrow Wilson, August 6, 1918; Wilson to Creel, August
8, 1918, Container 2, George Creel Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress,
Washington, D.C. For more on the Committee on Public Information, see Stephen
Vaughn, Holding Fast the Inner Lines: Democracy, Nationalism, and the Committee on
Pubic Information (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1980).
64. Vaughn, Holding Fast the Inner Lines, chap. 2; Christopher Capozzola, Uncle Sam
Wants You: World War I and the Making of the Modern American Citizen (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2008), ch. 6.
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campaigns and loyalty drives that emerged from public relations pro-
fessionals, the complex financing information generated and controlled
by the Treasury had a particular meaning and resonance among the elite
network of investors, wealthy taxpayers, business leaders, financial advi-
sers, and lawyers with whom Leffingwell and his colleagues had regular
contact. Thus, even when it came to directing public information, the law-
yers provided a distinctive contribution to the wartime state-building
project.
If maintaining jurisdictional powers and controlling public information
were indispensable to developing Treasury's claims of professional profi-
ciency, managing revenue collections and coordinating them with the tim-
ing of debt payments stretched the limits of such organizational capacity.
The extent of the department's capacities was tested in spring 1918
when the Treasury Department contemplated allowing taxpayers to defer
the payment of their federal income and profits taxes. Initially, the
Treasury lawyers acquiesced to the plan, but upon further reflection they
agreed that any deferment past the June 15, 1918 deadline for paying
the income and profits taxes would upset the delicate timing of certificate
and loan payments. As early as December 1917, Leffingwell warned
McAdoo that "we could not safely" issue a new series of certificates "if
deferred payments of taxes were permitted. '65
Although the Treasury Department opposed the idea of deferment, it
also realized that forcing taxpayers to pay all their income and profits
taxes at once could cause a dramatic shock to the economy. Bankers feared
that tax payments by their large corporate clients could trigger a panic run
on their reserves at a time when other clients would need to borrow to pay
their taxes; hence many in the business and financial communities urged
lawmakers to allow for deferred installment payments of federal taxes.
The Treasury lawyers carefully monitored revenue estimates, as they con-
sidered alternatives to tax deferment. 66
Treasury proposed several recommendations. In a widely circulated
letter to lawmakers, bankers, and leading members of the business commu-
nity, Leffingwell synthesized the work of his legal staff to illustrate how
existing laws and department decisions provided several possible solutions,
including the opportunity for "the partial payment, in advance, of income
and profits taxes," and the use of short-term certificates in lieu of cash to
65. Leffingwell to McAdoo, December 1917, Reel 1, RCLP; "May Accept Part Payment
of Taxes," Washington Post, April 12, 1918, 3.
66. "Banks Want Excess Tax Paid in Installments," Wall Street Journal, September 28,
1917, 2; "Want Only Revision in the War Tax Bill," New York Times, December 11,
1917, 14; "Installment Plan for Taxes Urged" Washington Post, March 14, 1918, 10;
Leffingwell to Love, March 2, 1918; March 7, 1918; March 19, 1918, Reel 3, RCLP.
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pay taxes. The recently enacted Liberty Bond Act, Leffingwell reminded
his readers, also permitted the Treasury to deposit the proceeds of tax pay-
ments into U.S. banks, thereby mitigating any potential short-term turnover
in bank deposits. The law, moreover, provided an appropriately timed cou-
pon payment that would help taxpayers meet their tax liabilities. With these
and other safeguards in place, Leffingwell confidently persuaded McAdoo
and other officials that there was no need to concede to the demands for tax
deferment.67
As the June tax deadline approached, Leffingwell and Love anxiously
monitored the increasing news coverage of expected tax payments.6 8 In
the end, the federal government collected nearly $2.8 billion in profits
and income taxes by the deadline, and an additional $855 million in
other internal revenues. 69 More important, the BIR was able to perform
the collection process without any difficulties to money markets or the
economy as a whole. "The tax payments were made without a ruffle,"
one banker explained with surprise. "The immense financial transaction
was consummated almost without being noticed. The transaction was put
through with perfect balance and without the least disturbance to business
or banking." McAdoo sent along his personal congratulations to
Leffingwell for guiding the successful collection process. 70
In administering wartime tax laws and policies, Treasury developed the
bureaucratic capacity that undergirded the legal legitimacy of the wartime
fiscal state. Even though at times they may have limited the transparency of
their actions, Leffingwell and his colleagues attempted to build public trust
by projecting the image of a rational executive agency. Gaining and main-
taining the faith of taxpayers and citizens was only one of the early and
ongoing challenges. When it came to formulating the broad principles of
fiscal policy, Treasury officials faced an equally daunting task of assuring
the public that the costs and sacrifices of underwriting a global conflict
were being shared equitably.
67. Leffingwell to Daniel Roper, n.d.; Leffingwell to Hoxsey, April 22, 1918; Leffingwell
to Frank E. Howe (President, Manufacturers National Bank); Leffingwell to Benjamin
Strong, April 22, 1918, Reel 4, RCLP.
68. Leffingwell to Love, April 12, 1918, Reel 4, RCLP; "Income Tax May Net
$4,000,000," New York Times, April 12, 1918, 17.
69. "U.S. Reaps Richest Harvest in Taxes," Washington Post, June 26, 1918; "War Taxes
in Year Yield $3,694,703,000," New York Times, August 7, 1918, 15.
70. "$3,000,000,000 Tax Paid With No Strain," New York Times, June 17, 1918, 10;
"Banks Easily Meet Income Tax Drain," Washington Post, June 23, 1918. Leflingwell to
McAdoo, June 28, 1918, Reel 8, RCLP.
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Formulating Policy and the State Obligations of Fiscal Citizenship
Among the principal policy issues confronting Treasury officials, none was
more salient than analyzing the war financing options. Although nearly
everyone agreed that a balance between taxes and public borrowing was
necessary, economic experts, social commentators, and lawmakers vastly
disagreed on the appropriate mix. Underpinning these policy debates
was the fundamental issue of how one defined the relationship between
patriotism, wartime sacrifice, and fiscal citizenship. What rights and obli-
gations, in other words, did citizens and the state have toward each other
during a war emergency?
For many social critics and policymakers, the answer was obvious.
Fiscal citizenship meant that members of the political community-as tax-
payers, creditors, and consumers-had a moral and patriotic duty to make
the necessary wartime sacrifices to support the state. "A new sense of the
obligations of citizenship will transform the spirit of the nation," the pro-
gressive journalist Fredrick Lewis Allen predicted at the start of the war.
Progressive tax reformers had for decades been promoting direct and
graduated taxation as a way to forge a new ethos of social solidarity and
civic obligation. Graduated taxes were based on the notion that each citizen
owed a debt to society in proportion to his or her ability to pay. By weaving
direct and graduated taxes into the fabric of U.S. legal institutions and cul-
ture, the Great War became a historic moment to further the progressive
commitment to shared social responsibility.71
Throughout the conflict, many political leaders emphasized the need to
use tax policy to spread wartime sacrifices evenly across class and region.
On the eve of the war, Claude Kitchin (D-NC), the House majority leader
and powerful chair of the Ways and Means Committee, did not hide his
sectional bias. When wealthy New York citizens, he wrote "are thoroughly
convinced that the income tax will have to pay for the increase in the army
and navy, they will not be one-half so frightened over the future invasion
of Germany and preparedness will not be so popular with them as it now
is." Others went further in criticizing the moneyed classes. "The stock
71. Kennedy, Over Here, 43-44; Richard T. Ely, Taxation in American States and Cities
(New York: Crowell, 1888); Edwin R. A. Seligman, The Income Tax (New York:
MacMillan, 1911). On the role of progressive political economists in supporting direct
and graduated taxes, see Hebert Hovenkamp, "The First Great Law & Economics
Movement," Stanford Law Review 42 (4) (1990): 993-1058; Ajay K. Mehrotra,
"Envisioning the Modem American Fiscal State: Progressive Era Economists and the
Intellectual Foundations of the U.S. Income Tax," UCLA Law Review 52 (6) (2005):
1793-1866. The transatlantic support for progressive taxes is explored in James T.
Kloppenberg, Uncertain Victory: Social Democracy and Progressivism in European and
American Thought, 1870-1920 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 355-56.
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brokers would not, of course, go to war, because the very object they have
in bringing on war is profit," declared the progressive Sen. George
W. Norris (R-NE). "They will be concealing in their palatial offices on
Wall Street, sitting behind mahogany desks, covered with clipped cou-
pons-coupons soiled with the sweat of mothers' tears, coupons dyed in
the lifeblood of their fellow man." '72
Several of the Treasury lawyers agreed that the national crisis and
nascent federal taxing powers provided a unique opportunity to promote
a new type of civic identity. Roper frequently instructed his BIR staff
to emphasize appeals to patriotism. He also enlisted the influence of the
American clergy and the publicity powers of popular and business period-
icals to spread the word about "The Glory of Paying the Income Tax."
And when opportunistic individuals sought to profit from turning in tax
evaders, Roper personally rebuked such attempts at personal gain with
nationalistic zeal. "Certainly no good citizen," he instructed one potential
informant, "would think of profiting on the understated taxes of his
neighbors-people unfamiliar with the intricacies of this complicated tax
law, not if he were a good citizen and had the right attitude toward
his own people-and the right attitude toward defending his country in
this war."'73
In the process of formulating broad fiscal policy, however, Treasury law-
yers stretched the meaning of fiscal citizenship beyond the conventional,
singular focus on the obligations and duties of citizens. Like the earlier
tax theorists and political activists who supported progressive taxation,
the wartime Treasury lawyers believed that fiscal citizenship meant that
the state had a reciprocal social obligation and democratic responsibility
to its citizens, a duty not only to protect them during war but to ensure
that the obligations of wartime fiscal sacrifice were equitably distributed
among community members. In this way, fiscal citizenship was not solely
a unidirectional force, requiring the allegiance only of individual citizens
to the activist state. Fiscal citizenship, instead, entailed a set of mutual
72. Arthur S. Link, Wilson: Campaigns for Progressivism and Peace (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1965), 62. For more on Kitchin, see Alex M. Amett, Claude
Kitchin and the Wilson War Policies (Boston: Little Brown, 1937); Homer Larry Ingle,
Pilgrimage To Reform: A Life of Claude Kitchin (PhD diss., University of Wisconsin,
1967); Norris quoted in Norman L. Zucker, George W. Norris, Gentle Knight of
American Democracy (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1966), 128.
73. "An Urgent Duty and a Glorious Privilege," The Literary Digest, January 12, 1918,
32; Roper, Fifty Years, 176, 180. Roper informed business journalists that they also had a
professional obligation to remind "the man who pays his Liberty tax in full, without question
or murmur, is no less a patriot than the man who invests in the Liberty bond or volunteers his
services for military duty." Roper, "The War Revenue Act and the Taxpayer," 5, DCRP.
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egalitarian responsibilities on state actors to spread more evenly the costs
and sacrifices of underwriting a modem global war. Because the new tax
laws had made the "government a partner with business," as Roper had
explained, the scale and scope of the new fiscal policies made it "increas-
ingly important that the partners co-operate for their common good."74
The dynamics of patriotism, wartime sacrifice, and fiscal citizenship
were perhaps best expressed in the policy debates over the proper mix of
wartime funding sources. On one side, there was a fragile congressional
coalition led by populist and progressive lawmakers like Kitchin and
Robert M. La Follette Sr. (R-WI) who wanted to use the newly created tax-
ing powers and the war emergency to redistribute wealth in a more equi-
table manner. Aligned against this coalition was a business community
that favored consumption taxes and a more general use of income taxes
aimed at all classes of society. Led by members of the northeastern com-
mercial elite, this group was cognizant of the regional ramifications of
shifting from a system of indirect consumption taxes to a regime of direct
and graduated levies. 75 The business community, of course, did not speak
with one voice. Many companies understood that the war required econ-
omic sacrifice, and more than a few firms did their part to hold the line
on prices and profits as part of their patriotic service. But when it came
to taxes, especially the new profits levies, U.S. companies used a variety
of maneuvers to ensure that wartime profits were not always returned to
the Treasury.76
If the disagreements between southern and western populists and
northeastern business elites echoed the tensions of the past, professional
economic experts did little to placate such opposition. Economists, in
fact, were equally divided over the issue of war financing. Some, like
0. M. W. Sprague of Harvard and Irving Fisher of Yale, favored a
"pay-as-you-go" method, using progressive income taxes and widespread
74. Roper, Fifty Years; Roper, "The War Revenue Act and the Taxpayer," DCRP. For a
recent examination of the World War I political culture surrounding a "citizenship of obli-
gation," see Capozzola, Uncle Same Wants You.
75. Even before the Revenue Act of 1917 was introduced in Congress, the New York
Chamber of Commerce issued a statement urging "the advisability of a more nearly universal
participation of the country's population in bearing the burdens of taxation; that the indirect
sources of revenue should not be abandoned or unduly minimized, and that direct sources
should not be overworked to the extent of arresting the financial ability of the country
to develop enterprise at home and abroad" ("New York Chamber of Commerce and
the Excess Profits Tax," Commercial and Financial Chronicle, February 3, 1917, 421);
"Opposition to the Excess Profits Tax By Business Men," Commercial and Financial
Chronicle, February 10, 1917, 517; "The Injustice of the Excess Profits Tax,"
Commercial and Financial Chronicle, May 19, 1917, 1957.
76. Brandes, Warhogs, 174-75, 172.
HeinOnline -- 28 Law & Hist. Rev. 203 2010
Law and History Review, February 2010
consumption taxes to curb inflation and finance the war. 77 Other leading
experts such as Edwin R. A. Seligman of Columbia and Charles
J. Bullock of Harvard feared that a resort to excessive taxation would
blunt the incentives for economic productivity. Although the latter group
conceded that taxes ought to be an important part of war financing, they
contended that increased borrowing would soon become necessary,
especially if the conflict became protracted. 78 In their role as moderators,
Treasury lawyers had to confront the controversy among the economic
experts and between populist politicians and the conservative business
community.
In doing so, Leffingwell and his colleagues underscored how fiscal citi-
zenship entailed a reciprocal social and democratic obligation on the state
to distribute fairly the burdens of wartime sacrifices. As policymakers were
considering a third round of Liberty Loans in the spring and summer of
1918, Leffingwell the "Wall Street Republican" argued for the importance
of taxation. "The sound rule to stick to," Leffingwell reminded McAdoo,
"is that taxes should be as heavy as they can safely be levied."'79
Although McAdoo had initially agreed, he soon became enamored with
the ease of issuing low-interest, tax-favored government debt.80 In his
attempt to capitalize patriotism, McAdoo embarked on a nationwide speak-
ing tour and enlisted the services of several of his Treasury lawyers, includ-
ing Thomas Love, and some of the country's leading artists and celebrities
to publicize the sale of govemment bonds.8 1
77. 0. M. W. Sprague, "Loans and Taxes in War Finance," American Economic Review
Supplement (March 1917): 199-223; Irving Fisher, "How the Public Should Pay for the
War," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 78 (July 1918):
112-17.
78. E. R. A. Seligman, "Borrowing Must Supplement Taxes in War Finance," New York
Times, April 15, 1917, E3; E. R. A. Seligman, "Loans versus Taxes in War Finance," Annals
of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 75 (January 1918): 52-82; Charles
J. Bullock, "Financing the War," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 31 (May 1917): 357-79;
Bullock, "Conscription of Income," North American Review 205 (June 1917): 895-904.
79. Leffingwell to McAdoo, March 1, 1918, Reel 3, RCLP.
80. Reflecting back on the war, McAdoo boasted in his memoirs about how he, unlike his
Civil War predecessor Treasury secretary Salmon Chase, was able to appeal directly to the
patriotic fervor of the people through several successful and oversubscribed bond drives.
"Any great war must necessarily be a popular movement," wrote McAdoo. "It is a kind
of crusade; and like all crusades, it sweeps along on a powerful stream of romanticism."
To harness such powerful emotions, McAdoo recalled, "we went direct to the people and
that means to everybody-to businessmen, workers, farmers, bankers, millionaires, school
teachers, laborers. We capitalized the profound impulse called patriotism" (McAdoo,
Crowded Years, 374).
81. McAdoo, Crowded Years, 374; Kennedy, Over Here, 105-6; "McAdoo Calls
Bankers," Washington Post, March 22, 1918, 5.
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Leffingwell agreed that "there is no substitute for the appeal to patriotism,"
but he held a broader understanding of patriotism, sacrifice, and fiscal citizen-
ship. Patriotism for McAdoo meant that the state could rely on the obligations
and responsibilities of its citizens to participate directly in funding the war
through loans and taxes. For Leffingwell and his legal colleagues, an
unreflective resort to more borrowing without a greater reliance on taxation
was an abdication of the state's civic responsibility to its citizens. To be
sure, the Treasury lawyers did not agree with Sprague and the political
activists who wanted to rely mainly on taxes; nor did they agree with those
who were issuing dire warnings about excessive taxation.
Rather, as arbiters of social forces, the lawyers sought to pave a more
moderate path. Leffingwell reminded McAdoo that reliance on a variety
of taxes could raise revenue, curtail consumption, and equitably spread
the costs of the war. With their experiences in the capital markets, the law-
yers understood that the trade-off between taxes and bonds was fundamen-
tally about timing-whether current or future taxpayers were responsible
for the war costs. A war financing policy that "forced people to take
bonds" was, in Leffingwell's estimation, a double penalty against future
taxpayers who would have to contend with paying back the war loans
and financing the postwar recovery. A resort to more borrowing posed
other problems as well. Flooding the credit market with government
loans was, Leffingwell assured McAdoo, a sure step towards financial
ruin-it "simply means an enormous amount of undigested securities
choking the market, depreciation in bond prices and ruin to the credit of
the United States and inflation of the currency." As the war progressed,
Leffingwell seemed to forget the significance of his comments, but his
remarks concerning inflation would prove to be quite prophetic.82
Besides analyzing the mix of financing options, the Treasury lawyers
also used their networks, skills, and experience in other more mundane,
though equally important, policymaking functions. Leffingwell and his
legal staff drew on their specific legal and business knowledge to channel
Treasury efforts in particular directions and to act as gatekeepers on the use
of state power. When McAdoo, for instance, wanted to explore the "federal
taxation of real estate," it was the Treasury lawyers working with the attor-
ney general's office who reminded the secretary that a national property tax
required "a Constitutional amendment to permit the United States to levy
direct taxes without apportionment. '83
82. Leffingwell to McAdoo, March 1, 1918, Reel 3, RCLP.
83. Leflingwell to Richmond Weed (Treasury legal staff), February 5, 1918; Leffingwell
to McAdoo, March 1918, Reel 2, RCLP; Brownlee, "Social Investigation and Political
Learning," 338.
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In monitoring state power, however, Treasury lawyers did not act only as
constraints. Just as all good gatekeepers are aware of alternative routes,
Treasury lawyers often used their technical knowledge, access, and exper-
tise to navigate around legal challenges to policy proposals. In the fall
of 1918, with German troops in retreat, the Wilson administration was
contemplating the creation of a War Trade Export Corporation, another
wartime corporatist entity that could be used specifically to tax exports.
Leffingwell and his legal staff not only reminded McAdoo that such a
levy was also "prohibited by express provision of the Constitution," they
went on to make a plausible alternative recommendation. 84
The recommendation illustrated how the Treasury lawyers used their
professional network and legal skills to craft long-run, forward-looking,
corporatist solutions. After consulting with members of the War Trade
Board-the existing agency supervising all import and export activity-
and his former Cravath partner, E. C. Henderson, whom Leffingwell
described as "the best lawyer I know, bar none," Leffingwell suggested
that the administration forsake the short-term-and constitutionally
futile-aim of trying to tax exports and focus instead on how the govern-
ment could use the waning months of the war to establish the country's
postwar trade position and long-term geopolitical power. To that end, he
suggested that a new corporatist agency be established along the lines of
the War Industries Board to organize and license exporters. This plan,
Leffingwell continued, "would have the great advantage ...of tending
to bring the export houses in a position where they would be able after
the war to develop our foreign trade, instead of practically putting them
out of business during the period of the war and leaving them disorganized
and disheartened to deal with after-the-war problems." To assuage the
administration's desire to tax the growing profits of exporters,
Leffingwell assured McAdoo that the robust wartime profits tax "can be
trusted to take into the Treasury excessive profits which may result from
the adoption of this plan. '85 The imminent end of the war less than a
month later precluded McAdoo from pursuing an export tax or creating
a new export licensing agency, but the suggestion vividly illustrated how
Treasury lawyers had become attracted to the corporatist model of
state-building.
84. Leffingwell to McAdoo, October 16, 1918, Reel 15, RCLP.
85. Ibid. Efforts to bolster U.S. postwar trade policy would, of course, also benefit the cor-
porate bar, as leading Treasury lawyers like Leffingwell and Roper embarked upon postwar
careers with a growing international focus (Ron Chemow, The House of Morgan: An
American Banking Dynasty and the Rise of Modern Finance [New York: Grove, 1990],
251, 312-14); Roper, Fifty Years, 207-8.
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The search for new sources of tax revenues and the appeals to patriotism
and fiscal citizenship were examples of how the Treasury department
attempted to spread the costs of the war across a broad swath of socioeco-
nomic classes, regions, and even generations. But, ultimately, the war
financing policies had complex and often contradictory consequences.
McAdoo seemed to be aware of how the interest rate on bonds could
have far reaching implications. In deliberately setting an initially low
rate of interest, McAdoo contended that "we should be reducing the cost
of war, not only today for ourselves, but, in the future for ourselves and
for our brave men who are fighting in France and will have little or no
opportunity to accumulate and invest in Liberty Bonds though they must
upon their return join the army of taxpayers who must pay this interest."86
McAdoo's rhetoric about helping the quotidian "army of taxpayers" did
not match his actions, or wartime reality. The so-called army of ordinary
taxpayers was rather slim. Though the sundry consumption taxes affected
a broad swath of citizens, and generated some colorful protests, the vast
bulk of federal tax revenue came from the income and profits taxes on
wealthy individuals and prosperous businesses. Preoccupied with assua-
ging the social concerns over war profiteering, policymakers seemed to
give little consideration to taxing the mass of middle-class wage eamers-
an option that would be effectively exercised in World War 11.87
The initially low, tax-exempt interest rates set on government debt,
furthermore, did not extract the type of wartime financial sacrifice that
the Treasury department claimed. The tax exemption disproportionately
benefited wealthy individuals not only because they were the primary
investors in the largest bond offerings but also because they were the
ones subject to the highest progressive marginal rates. 88 Though the con-
sistent oversubscription of Liberty Loans was a clear political victory,
86. McAdoo to Kitchin and Simmons, September 5, 1918, Reel 12, RCLP; McAdoo
further informed lawmakers that the Treasury "sought to avoid the issue of bonds at such
rate and upon such terms as might result ultimately, when the war is won, in the accumu-
lation of great wealth in the hands of a relatively small proportion of our population, carrying
interest at a high rate and exempt from taxes" (Gilbert, American Financing of WWI, 126).
87. Brandes, Warhogs, 129-31. For more on how World War II policymakers helped
institutionalize a mass income taxpaying culture, see Kennedy, Freedom From Fear,
624-25; Carolyn Jones, "Class Tax to Mass Tax: The Role of Propaganda in the
Expansion of the Income Tax During World War II," Buffalo Law Review (37) (1989):
685-737; James T. Sparrow, "'Buying Our Boys Back': The Mass Foundations of Fiscal
Citizenship in World War II," Journal of Policy History 20 (2) (2008): 263-86.
88. In fact, as the economic historian Hugh Rockoff has shown, investors in Liberty Loans
received an after-tax rate of return that matched the yield on other assets of equal risk,
suggesting that, in spite of McAdoo's ambitions, the bond drives did little to capitalize on
patriotism (Rockoff, "Until It's Over," 322-27).
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the bonds did not have the economic impact that Treasury envisioned. With
their knowledge of the interactions of taxes and market forces, the Treasury
lawyers were undoubtedly aware of these contradictory actions, but they
seemed ineffective in altering policy.89
Another way in which financing policies undermined economic goals
was the inadvertent increase in the price level. In its zeal to issue debt,
Treasury fostered a "borrow and buy" mentality among bond investors
that, rather than redirecting moneys away from current consumption, in
fact, created new money and fueled inflation. In theory, bond sales to
the nonbanking public could restrain inflation by absorbing consumer
spending, while transferring real economic resources from private con-
sumption to war production. But because the Treasury department encour-
aged individual investors to use borrowed funds to purchase government
debt, and because much of the below-market, short-term debt issued by
the Treasury was bought directly by banks, the massive wartime borrow-
ing, in the end, fueled rather than contained inflation.90
Changes to the nascent Federal Reserve System exacerbated inflationary
pressures. Legal modifications to reserve requirements, the centralization of
reserves in district banks, and the expansion of banks eligible to be federal
depositories were just some of the subtle changes to monetary policy that
led to an incredibly elastic money supply. Indeed, the combination of
increased bank borrowing and permissive monetary policies led to an
explosive growth in the money supply and a concomitant mushrooming
of the price level. 91 Although he claimed to have learned from the errors
of the past, McAdoo's resort to easy money, in the end, had a striking
resemblance to the Civil War printing of greenbacks.
The Treasury lawyers unwittingly contributed to the increased bank
borrowing and the resulting inflation. From his perch as undersecretary,
Leffingwell endorsed McAdoo's contradictory ideas and actions. Despite
his earlier warnings about the adverse impact of excessive borrowing,
89. Studenski and Krooss, Financial History, 288-92. The attractiveness of government
securities continued to be a thorny issue for fiscal policymakers well after the war. On the
postwar effects of tax-favored government securities, see Murray, "Bureaucracy and
Bipartisanship"; M. Susan Mumane, "Selling Scientific Taxation: The Treasury
Department's Campaign for Tax Reform in the 1920s," Law & Social Inquiry 29 (4)
(2004): 819-58.
90. Friedman and Schwartz, Monetary History; Studenski and Kroos, Financial History,
288-89; Rockoff, "Until It's Over," 317-19.
91. From June 1916 to June 1919, the money supply expanded by over $11 billion and
consumer prices increased nearly 66 percent while the cost of living rose over 70 percent.
As economic historians have explained, "The Federal Reserve became to all intents and pur-
poses the bond-selling window of the Treasury, using its monetary policy almost exclusively
to that end" (Friedman and Schwartz, Monetary History, 216).
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Leffingwell seemed to suspend his financial judgment. Not only
did Leffingwell encourage financial institutions, including Federal
Reserve member banks, to accept U.S. bonds as collateral for loans92; he
also supported McAdoo's attempts to use moral suasion and appeals to
patriotism, rather than legal restrictions, to prevent investors from selling
their bonds for further spending. Leffingwell believed, like McAdoo,
that a liberal democracy, even during wartime-perhaps especially during
wartime--could not restrict the economic decisions of its citizens by pro-
hibiting them from selling their financial assets. "It is of course important
to avoid making people think that if they subscribe they will not be per-
mitted to sell," Leffingwell remarked in an April 1918 telegram to
McAdoo. "We realize that subscribers might have to sell their bonds and
should be protected as far as possible against losses. '93
Like McAdoo, Leffingwell preferred to contain inflation with appeals to
patriotism and the fiscal responsibilities of investors, rather than more for-
ceful actions. "It should be the object of the Secretary of the Treasury, and
of all public men," Leffingwell sternly informed lawmakers, "not to encou-
rage people to lend their money to the Government one day and to take it
back the next, nor to make it easy for them to do so, but to teach the people
to save and lend their money to the Government for a period of years.
Liberty loans are an investment-the best on earth. They are not currency
and are not meant to be."' 94 Leffingwell went even further in relying on
civic virtue to restrain private spending. He reminded the secretary with
words from McAdoo's own annual report that wealthy Americans had
additional wartime financial and civic responsibilities: "The men and
women of large and moderate means owe a greater duty, because they
have a larger margin of income, to cut off self-indulgences, to deny them-
selves useless and needless luxuries, to make sacrifices of comforts, plea-
sures, and conveniences that will effect genuine economies and set an
example to the Nation." '95
The fiscal sacrifices of citizens at home were inextricably linked to the
physical sacrifices made by soldiers at the frontlines. As Leffingwell
reminded McAdoo, quoting again from the secretary's annual report: "It
is a sacred duty of every citizen and it should be regarded as a glorious pri-
vilege of every patriot to uphold the Government's credit with the same
92. See, for example, Leffingwell to McAdoo, December 8, 1917; Leffingwell to
F. H. Meeker, Esq. (President, Unadilla National Bank), December 1917, Reel 1, RCLP.
93. Leffingwell to McAdoo, April 6, 1918, Reel 4, RCLP.
94. Leffingwell to Kitchin, December 1917; Leffingwell to Rep. Richard Olney,
December 1917, Reel 1, RCLP.
95. Leffingwell to McAdoo, April 6, 1918, Reel 4, RCLP; U.S. Treasury Department,
Annual Report, 1917, 3.
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kind of self sacrifice and nobility of soul that our gallant sons exhibit when
they die for us on the battle fields of Europe. It is as imperative to sustain
the Government's credit as it is to sustain our armies because our armies
cannot be sustained unless the Government's credit is always above
reproach."'96 Not all citizens, of course, embraced this "sacred duty" or
"glorious privilege," and some lawmakers may have viewed Treasury's
words as hollow rhetoric. But Leffingwell and McAdoo certainly believed
they could mobilize patriotism to their advantage, even though their actions
were, in the end, obfuscating the true costs of the war.97
Although the dynamics of the war frequently overwhelmed policy-
makers' intentions, the Treasury lawyers did moderate the formation
of broad fiscal policies. Leffingwell's admonishments in spring 1918 to
balance taxes and borrowing expressed a broader social desire to spread
equally the costs of wartime sacrifices. The subsequent legislation,
which was not enacted until the winter of 1919, after the armistice and
after Republicans took control of Congress, was not nearly as progressive
as some populist lawmakers had anticipated; nor was it as reactionary as
some business leaders and conservative legislators had hoped. Instead,
the new tax law revealed that the Wilson administration was not willing
to renounce the social and ethical obligations of fiscal citizenship.
In their role as policymakers, the Treasury lawyers were not simply
passive scientific engineers; they were also policy and political entrepre-
neurs, seeking to convince lawmakers of the legitimacy and usefulness
of their expertise and knowledge. They were not simply builders of organ-
izational capacity; they occasionally used their increased power to exercise
a new found bureaucratic autonomy. 98 Simply put, they were not just
interest takers, but interest makers who engaged the legislative process
with their insights about the consequences of the laws and policies they
were asked to implement. Thus, in advancing administrative governance,
the Treasury lawyers both effectively executed the democratic will
of Congress and at times challenged lawmakers when the implications of
new statutes seemed to become unhinged from the original aims. One of
the most forceful challenges of existing law came in the spring and summer
of 1918 when Treasury questioned the efficacy of the excess-profits tax.
96. Ibid.
97. Gilbert, American Financing of WWI, 232-36; Rockoff, "Until It's Over," 332-38;
Kennedy, Over Here, 137-43.
98. For more on how "mezzo-level" government officials used their networks and reputa-
tions to create policies that were independent of lawmakers, see Carpenter, Forging
Bureaucratic Autonomy.
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Between Justice and Revenue: Evaluating and Defending
the Excess-Profits Tax
From the start, the initial profits tax on munitions makers and the sub-
sequent excess-profits tax on all businesses were rooted in social concerns
over war profiteering. As early as 1917, the popular journal The Outlook
documented "the extraordinary increase in profits" among the leading
industrial concerns. Comparing the profits of over one hundred companies
from 1914 to 1916, the editors calculated that the aggregate "profits of
these one hundred and four corporations exceed the profits of the year in
which the war began by over a billion dollars." (See Table 2). With
these soaring profits came bloated dividends and rising returns on equity,
at a time when the stock market as a whole was witnessing substantial
drops in real value. From this statistical evidence, The Outlook joined
other leading popular periodicals in supporting an excess-profits tax to
make "the war-brides pay up." 99
The social protest against war profiteering led to the adoption of the
1917 excess-profits tax. But many economic and legal experts questioned
the efficiency, administrability, and even constitutionality of a tax on all
profits beyond a "normal level." The main point of contention seemed to
rest with the idea of using "invested capital" as a baseline from which
excess profits could be determined. Seligman seemed to sum up the hosti-
lity towards the notion of "invested capital" when he wrote that "what
constitutes capital is so elusive as to be virtually impossible of precise cal-
culation." 100 Members of the business and legal communities echoed
Seligman's concerns. The Commercial and Financial Chronicle-that bas-
tion of orthodox business thinking-attacked the "Excessive Taxation of
'Excess' Profits" as "governmental confiscation of wealth." Favoring the
British version of a war-profits tax, the editors of The Wall Street
Journal similarly disparaged the excess-profits tax as "hasty and ill-advised
legislation... rushed through Washington by politicians desiring political
favor with the many by taxing the capital of the few." Lawyers represent-
ing financial interests added their voice. Harping on the alleged unconsti-
tutionality of the excess-profits tax, Robert R. Reed, the counsel for the
99. "Helping the War Pay for Itself," The Outlook, June 27, 1917, 319-20; "To Tax
'Excess Profits' The Literary Digest, January 27, 1917, 176; "The Excess Profits Tax,"
The New Republic, September 15, 1917, 174-75; Bmndes, Warhogs, 135-37.
100. Although Seligman had been a longtime supporter of graduated income taxes as the
proper method of taxing according to the progressive principle of ability to pay, he opposed
the excess-profits tax because "the choice of capital not only constitutes a clumsy attempt to
reach taxable ability, but introduces a gross inequality in principle and a deplorable uncer-
tainty in administration" (Edwin R. A. Seligman, "The Excess-Profits Tax" The Nation,
March 28, 1918, 365-66).
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Table 2. Increase in Corporate Profits of Select U.S. Corporations, 1914-1916
(nominal dollar amounts).
Corporation 1914 1916 Amount of %
Increase Increase
American Locomotive $2,076,127 $10,769,429 $8,693,302 419%
Co.
Bethlehem Steel Corp. 5,590,020 43,593,968 38,003,948 680%
U.S. Steel Corp. 23,496,768 271,531,730 248,034,962 1056%
Du Pont (E.I.) Nemours 4,831,793 82,013,020 77,181,227 1597%
& Co.
General Motors Co. 7,249,733 28,789,560 21,539,827 297%
Source: "Helping the War Pay For Itself," The Outlook, June 27, 1917, 319-20. A similar
table was printed in the Congressional Record as part of the House discussion of the
excess-profits tax. Congressional Record, May 18, 1917, 65th Cong., 1st Sess., 2541.
Investment Bankers' Association, assailed the law as a "confiscatory tax on
businesses." 101
Soon after it was enacted, opponents of the excess-profits tax commis-
sioned a group of economists to conduct a comparative investigation of
U.S. and British war financing. Under the supervision of Thomas
S. Adams, the BIR's chief economist, Treasury organized its own team
of economists, accountants, and lawyers to examine the consequences of
the existing excess-profits tax. Adams's study supported what many in
the financial and academic communities had predicted from the start,
namely, that the excess-profits tax appeared to have unintended conse-
quences. The existing levy, with its use of "invested capital" as the baseline
for determining "excess profits," was adversely affecting small businesses
more than the large corporations it was designed to attack. Larger corpor-
ations were able to manipulate the law to reduce their tax liability.
By increasing their invested capital, either by issuing more equity or by
increasing their investments in intangible assets or through other account-
ing maneuvers, they could inflate the base from which their rates of return
and profits were calculated, thereby placing their net profits in a lower tax
bracket. By contrast, smaller enterprises, especially those that relied mainly
on personal services such as family businesses, did not have high levels of
capital to begin with, nor did they have the slack to adjust their capital
101. "Excessive Taxation of 'Excess' Profits," Commercial and Financial Chronicle,
September 1, 1917; "The Mysteries of the 8% Excess Profits Tax," Commercial and
Financial Chronicle, April 28, 1917; "Washington Finance," Wall Street Journal, April
27, 1917; "Assails the Profits Tax; Counsel of Bankers' Association Warns Against Hasty
Legislation," New York Times, December 6, 1918.
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levels or annual investments. Thus, they were hardest hit by the
excess-profits tax.10
2
Even before the Treasury completed its study, McAdoo was encouraging
lawmakers to consider supplementing the existing excess-profits tax with a
new British-style profits tax that levied a high flat rate on all profits above
prewar average earnings. Since Kitchin remained the key congressional
supporter of the excess-profits tax, McAdoo took his recommendation
directly to the powerful southern congressman. In a carefully drafted letter,
McAdoo explained how "the existing excess profits tax does not always
reach war profits." McAdoo argued that "a flat rate of 80% on all war
profits," those measured against a prewar average of profits, was a better
method for getting at war profiteering. 10 3 Kitchin remained unconvinced.
From the beginning, populists like Kitchin and progressives like La
Follette wanted to make the excess-profits tax a permanent part of the
national tax system. Enacting a tax that relied on prewar earnings as its
baseline would mean conceding that the levy was a temporary measure-
one that could be discarded easily at the end of the conflict.
10 4
Treasury completed its initial investigation of the excess-profits tax in
the summer of 1918, just as the Ways and Means Committee was drafting
its version of a new tax bill. The Treasury lawyers eagerly used the depart-
ment's study to build the necessary support for the war profits tax. Because
Leffingwell had long suspected the inequities of using invested capital as a
measure of excess profits, he enthusiastically marshaled the resources of
the department to lobby Kitchin.10 5 The study, together with numerous
petitions from small businesses, confirmed Leffingwell's suspicions that
102. "Memorandum on the Differences Between a War Profits and an Excess Profits Tax,"
July 27, 1918, NARA Excess Profits Tax Folder; Leffingwell to Adams, July 27, 1918, Reel
10, RCLP; Brownlee, "Economists and the Modem Tax System," 415-17; George 0. May,
"Methods of English War Profits Tax," New York Times, September 4, 1917.
103. McAdoo to Kitchin, June 5, 1918, (emphasis in the original) NARA Excess Profits
Tax Folder.
104. Amett, Claude Kitchin, 260; Blakey and Blakey, Federal Income Tax, 133. Some
Treasury lawyers shared the vision of a postwar political economy that retained the excess
profits tax as a permanent bulwark against corporate concentration. "The manifest advantage"
of the excess profits tax, one Treasury lawyer wrote, is that it could become "a permanent part
of the Government's revenue system, and can be used, if need be, as a check upon monopolies
or trusts earning exorbitant profits" (Perry S. Talbert [Head of Law Division, Commissioner of
Internal Revenue] to George R. Cooksey [Assistant to Secretary McAdoo], August 8, 1917,
quoted in Brownlee "Economists and the Modem Tax System," 408). Talbert was a member
of the BIR throughout the war, and he leveraged his position to become a Washington, D.C.,
tax consultant after the war. Roper, Fifty Years, 181-82; P. S. Talbert, "Relief Provisions and
Treasury Procedure on Appeal," in The Federal Income Tax, ed. Robert M. Haig (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1921), 250-61.
105. Leffingwell to McAdoo, July 31, 1918, Reel 10, RCLP.
HeinOnline -- 28 Law & Hist. Rev. 213 2010
214 Law and History Review, February 2010
the excess-profits tax did not accurately capture the profits created by the
war, and that it was permitting the growth of corporate capitalism rather
than curbing or taming it. 10 6
Leffingwell's understanding of the study seemed to be in some tension,
however, with its actual conclusions. Whereas the investigation focused
mainly on the rate structure of the excess-profits tax, Leffingwell high-
lighted instead the problems of using "invested capital" as a base to
measure excess profits. 10 7 As corporate lawyers, Leffingwell and
Ballantine, who also had some reservations, may have been uneasy
about using newly created state capacity to regulate corporate profits.
Other Treasury officials, including Roper, were concerned about moving
to a war-profits tax based on prewar earnings, but Leffingwell was confi-
dent that a war-profits tax was the fair and just method because it balanced
the need for revenue with concerns about economic productivity. 10 8
In a confidential memo to the president's secretary, George Tumulty,
Leffingwell identified what he thought were the fundamental differences
between the war profits and the excess profits taxes:
A war profits tax finds its sanction in the conviction of all patriotic men of
whatever economic school, that no one should profit largely by the war.
The excess profits tax must rest upon the wholly indefensible notion that it
is a function of taxation to bring all profits down to one level with relation
to the amount of capital invested, and to deprive industry, foresight and saga-
city of their fruits. The excess profits tax exempts capital and burdens brains,
ability and energy. 10 9
The department's study did not explicitly criticize the excess-profits tax in
such sharp terms. Indeed, some economic experts believed that the existing
levy might not be excessive, nor that it would hinder economic
productivity. But, for Leffingwell, the excess profits tax was "wholly
106. Brownlee, "Social Investigation and Political Learning," 357-59. For a sample of
some of the complaints from small businesses against the excess-profits tax see,
Leffingwell to Love, August 24, 1918; Leffingwell to Tunstall, September 4, 1918;
J. MacFarlane (President, Red River Iron Works) to Leffingwell, August 21, 1918,
NARA Excess Profits Tax Folder.
107. More specifically, the Treasury report focused on replacing the steeply graduated
rates of the existing excess-profits tax with an exceptionally high flat rate of 80 percent
on all profits above a prewar average ("Confidential Memorandum Concerning War
Profits Taxes and Excess Profits Taxes," July 31, 1918; Roper, Fifty Years, 182).
108. In addition to Roper's reservations, which he did not make public, Herbert Hoover,
the head of the Food Administration also supported the excess-profits tax ("Excess Profits
Tax Backed By Hoover," New York World, August 17, 1928, clipping in NARA Excess
Profits Tax Folder).
109. "Confidential Memorandum Concerning War Profits Taxes and Excess Profits
Taxes," July 31, 1918, NARA Excess Profits Tax Folder.
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indefensible" because it fundamentally challenged the precepts of modem
American capitalism. The former corporate lawyer was willing to attack
war profiteering, but he was not interested in undermining the long-term
incentives that he believed were the driving force of the nation's economic
growth and productivity.
In his private memo, Leffingwell went even further in criticizing the general
theory of taxing corporations at progressive rates: "Any graduated tax upon
corporations is indefensible in theory for corporations are only aggregations
of individuals and by such a tax the numerous small stockholders of a great
corporation may be taxed at a higher rate than the very wealthy large stock-
holders of a relatively smaller corporation." In echoing this common critique,
Leffingwell emphasized the report's conclusion about the unintended conse-
quences of the existing excess-profits tax. "The object of a graduated tax
should be to make taxes fall upon the rich who are best able to pay them,"
Leffingwell explained. "The graduated excess profits tax disregards this,
and often produces the reverse result."' 10 In criticizing progressive corporate
tax rates, Leffingwell was seeking indirectly to support the move to a higher
fiat rate on all war-as opposed to excess-profits.
Leffingwell's memo appeared to achieve its intended objective. "The
course of the Administration is plain," Tumulty responded the following
day. "We must stand for the War Profits Tax to the end." He hastened to
add that "the 'staging' of the whole business" of presenting the adminis-
tration's position to Congress and the public was "most important."
Bureaucratic autonomy rested heavily on how the ideas of unelected admin-
istrators were framed for democratically accountable lawmakers. That same
day President Wilson wrote Kitchin to inform him of the importance of "a
war profits tax as distinguished from a mere excess profits tax." The former,
the president claimed, was "manifestly equitable." Acknowledging the diffi-
culty of enacting a tax increase during an election year, Wilson optimistically
assured Kitchin that a new profits tax would be well received by the business
community. "I do not believe that the manufacturers of the country who are
now making profits directly from war work would object" to the new tax,
wrote Wilson. "On the contrary, I think that they would feel a certain pride
in sharing the burdens of the war directly with the men who are giving their
lives for the safety of America and the freedom of the world."'
110. Ibid.
111. Tumulty to Leffingwell, August 1, 1918; Wilson to Kitchin, August 2, 1918, NARA
Excess Profits Tax Folder. Leffingwell bolstered his case by directly contacting President
Wilson to notify him that the difference between the two levies was not merely semantic:
"It is sufficient to say that the difference is not one of words but one of substance and
goes to the very root of the social and economic problem" (Leffingwell to Wilson,
August 2, 1918, quoted in Ingle, Pilgrimage, 150).
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Unsurprisingly, the existing excess-profits levy still had its supporters.
In addition to Kitchin, there were others who maintained that the
excess-profits tax, even with its flaws, was, as one agrarian group described
it, a potent symbol of "justice over revenue." In a letter to McAdoo, the
Farmers' National Committee contended that not enough of the war was
being financed through taxation. Its members proposed a "Liberty Tax
Bill" as a corollary to the Liberty Loan drives. Speaking on behalf of
numerous farmer and labor groups, the Farmers' National Committee
called for a fiscal policy in which "one-half of the cost of the war shall
be raised by current taxation upon excess and war profits, upon incomes,
and upon the unearned increment of land values." McAdoo passed along
this correspondence to Leffingwell, who responded with a letter of his
own optimistically stating how taxation had made up "almost one-third
of our total expenditures in the fiscal year 1918."112
To reinforce its support for a war-profits tax, Treasury commissioned its
economist T. S. Adams to conduct another systematic comparison of
profits taxes. Before taking responsibility for a new wartime tax measure-
during an election year no less-Treasury officials wanted to be certain that
the war-profits tax could promote distributional ideals without harming
revenue. Adams's second report confirmed that an 80 percent fiat tax on
profits above a prewar average would extract more revenue from big
businesses as compared to smaller enterprises, with only a small decline
in revenue. The second study, however, explicitly recommended maintain-
ing the excess-profits tax, as a supplement to a new war-profits tax. An
excess-profits levy would reach those corporations, such as the Ford
Motor Company, "which earned an unusually high rate of profits in the
prewar period.., but would pay no war-profits tax." Although the report's
emphasis on the virtues of the excess-profits tax may have disappointed
Leffingwell, he nonetheless set aside his personal views and redoubled
his efforts to support the department's position to maintain the
excess-profits tax.113
112. Arthur Capper (Chairman of the Farmers' National Committee for War Finance) to
McAdoo, August 10, 1918; Leffingwell to Capper, August 27, 1918, NARA Excess Profits
Tax Folder. Agrarian associations echoed these demands in a more formal proposal before
lawmakers, which called for the "democratic financing of war costs by the retention of the
income and excess profits taxes" ("Farmers Outline Their Program for Legislation,"
New York Times, December 15, 1919, 1). Some newspaper editors, and even some officials
within the Wilson administration, seemed to agree with the farmers ("Dodging the
War-Profits Issue," New York World, July 30, 1918, 7; "An Example of War Profits,"
New York World, August 1, 1918, clippings in NARA Excess Profits Tax Folder).
113. "Corporations Paying War-Profits and Excess-Profits Taxes," October 18, 1918,
NARA Excess Profits Tax Folder.
HeinOnline -- 28 Law & Hist. Rev. 216 2010
Lawyers, Guns, and Public Moneys
Eventually, Treasury officials were able to persuade Congress to accept
the proposal of levying both a war-profits and excess-profits tax. By
September 1918, the House drafted and passed a comprehensive revenue
bill that included a dizzyingly complex corporate levy containing both
an excess-profits and war-profits tax.1 14 The mobilization of the depart-
ment's economic and legal expertise helped broker a compromise that con-
vinced Kitchin and other lawmakers that a hybrid or dual-profits tax was
the appropriate solution to war profiteering. Consequently, the Treasury
lawyers were able to reframe the new profits tax as a temporary measure,
one that was linked to prewar average profits and that, therefore, could be
easily dismantled after the conflict. Leffingwell and his colleagues thus
were able to reorient the demands of activist social groups like the
Farmers' National Committee and populist lawmakers like Kitchin.
Although the bill was not enacted until the following year, the proposed
tax increase, coming just before the armistice and midterm elections, had
significant political ramifications, helping to deliver resounding congres-
sional victories for the Republican Party.' 15
As lawmakers and Treasury officials were evaluating the merits of the
excess-profits tax, lawyers at the BIR were considering the constitutionality
of the levy. The BIR lawyers knew early on that one of the greatest chal-
lenges in administering the excess-profits tax was "clarifying what invested
capital means." In tackling this task, Ballantine, as the lead BIR lawyer,
acknowledged that the excess-profits levy might face some constitutional
challenges. Opponents of the law, such as Robert Reed, the legal represen-
tative of investment banking interests, had been suggesting in no uncertain
terms that the vagueness of invested capital made the excess- profits tax an
unconstitutional form of government confiscation. With these comments in
mind, Ballantine used his technical legal skills to lay out a detailed doc-
trinal defense of the excess-profits tax in a 1919 article in the Yale Law
Journal. 116
There were primarily two parts of the excess-profits tax law that
Ballantine believed might pose some constitutional issues. The first was,
114. Corporations were required to pay the higher of either a graduated excess-profits tax,
ranging from 35 to 70 percent, measured with reference to invested capital, or a war-profits
tax of 80 percent on net income in excess of a specific credit and the average net income for
the prewar years of 1911-13 (Blakey and Blakey, Federal Income Tax, 167-69).
115. See, generally, John D. Hicks, Republican Ascendancy, 1921-33 (New York:
Harper, 1960).
116. "Boston Man Named for Job; Ballantine Chosen by President for Solicitor of Internal
Revenue," press clipping, Box 1: IRS Solicitor 1917-19, ABP; "Excess Tax Review Board,"
Wall Street Journal, April 3, 1918; Ballantine, "Some Constitutional Aspects of the Excess
Profits Tax," Yale Law Journal 29 (6) (1919): 625-42.
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as Reed suggested, a Fifth Amendment due process challenge to the use of
"invested capital" as the tax base for measuring excess profits. The second
potential issue was whether the "relief clauses" of the law, which allowed
the BIR to use comparative statistics to impute invested capital for those
businesses that did not have any invested capital, were an unconstitutional
delegation of congressional authority. On both counts, Ballantine con-
cluded, "the decided cases appear to disclose little probability that the
statute will be upset on either ground."'' 1 7
Ballantine agreed that the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment
could be a legitimate restraint theoretically on the arbitrary exercise of
Congress's taxing powers. But in his analysis of the case law, a tax
based on the ratio of profits to invested capital was wholly permissible
and well within Congress's taxing powers. "As to a method of taxation,
like any 'classification,' the question is whether there is any reasonable
ground for it or whether it is simply arbitrary," wrote Ballantine.
Analyzing a litany of cases, Ballantine contended that any judicial chal-
lenge to the congressional taxing power on the grounds of due process
was likely to fail. "So vigorous has been the Court in its support of federal
taxing power," Ballantine reasoned, "that all the attacks upon taxing
statutes under the Fifth Amendment, upon the ground of their unequal
operation, have so far failed."1 18
The second aspect of the excess profits tax that Ballantine addressed was
the constitutionality of the "relief sections" that gave the BIR discretion
in imputing invested capital to a business. In determining whether these
provisions were an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority,
Ballantine contended that providing "relief' through these provisions
was simply a function of administering the law, and was not therefore an
exercise in legislative authority. "So long as it can be said that all that is left
by Congress to administrative officers is the determination of how a taxing
provision applies to a particular state of facts," Ballantine reasoned, "no
delegation is involved.""19
117. "Urges A Sound Basis for Wartime Taxes," New York Times, June 18, 1918, 17;
Ballantine, "Constitutional Aspects," 627.
118. Ballantine, "Constitutional Aspects," 630.
119. Ibid., 639. Ballantine also maintained that the congressional use of "invested capital"
to measure excess profits was part of the practical, institutional deference that the Court had
long granted in the context of tax laws: "The decided cases show that the presumption that
each act of Congress is valid, is applied with special readiness to revenue acts and that the
Court, even without the persuasive effect of the imperative need for war revenue, would not
be likely to declare invalid a taxing act framed with anything like reasonable regard to its just
incidence" (639).
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Ballantine bolstered his defense by appealing to historical context. He
admitted that in an earlier age one could claim that legislatures should
maintain the responsibility of creating and administering revenue laws.
But in a modem, industrial society where a complex array of laws and
regulations were increasingly needed to provide the stability and consist-
ency of an ordered society, effective administration of these new laws
and regulations required the creation of new government agencies and
organizations. "Recognizing the increasing variety of the subject matter
upon which statutes operate, and the increasing complexity of the result
sought to be achieved by statutes," Ballantine wrote, "the courts have
gone much farther than under the simpler conditions of an earlier period
in supporting the extensive use by the legislative arm of the more flexible
executive instrumentality."' 120  Ballantine's legal defense of the
excess-profits tax was not just an academic exercise. His views provided
some stability for an uncertain legal environment, and in time his legal
analysis was vindicated when the Court upheld the excess profits tax
soon after the war.121
Lest one confuse Ballantine's constitutional defense of the excess-profits
tax as an unequivocal endorsement, the former corporate lawyer judi-
ciously balanced his support of the levy with some biting criticism of it
on nonlegal grounds. Like many others, Ballantine thought the tax had sev-
eral significant drawbacks. It did not curb inflation; it angered taxpayers
with its inquisitorial requirements; and it could promote a great deal of
uncertainty and delay in generating revenue. Together, these concerns
could-and would-ultimately lead to the repeal of the excess-profits
tax, but as far as its legal foundations were concerned, Ballantine was con-
vinced that "there is little likelihood that the court will conclude that the
discrimination involved in the excess profits tax is hostile or arbitrary."
If business owners and taxpayers in general believed that the excess-profits
tax was unwise, there were other methods to address the problem beyond
judicial challenges. Ballantine, ever the moderate, concluded, "It is to
Congress rather than to the courts that the taxpayer must look for a fairer
and wiser distribution of the revenue burden."' 22 Ballantine's words were
120. Ibid., 641.
121. LaBelle Iron Works v. United States 256 U.S. 377 (1921), 393.
122. Ballantine, "Constitutional Aspects," 635, 642. Despite his initial reservations about
the administrability of an excess profits tax, he conceded that the levy had distributional
merit: "So far as revenue yield was concerned a sufficiently high flat tax upon business
or corporate incomes would have been as effective as the [excess-profits tax], and would
have been easier to compute and to administer. A high flat tax would, however, have
been borne with undue hardship on the enterprise" that was only moderately connected to
the war effort. "And it would not have reached the limit of what was conceived to be the
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prescient. Soon after the war, it was to Congress that opponents of the
excess-profits tax successfully turned in repealing the measure-to the
immense disappointment of populist fiscal reformers and social groups
who had hoped to make the excess-profits tax a permanent part of the
U.S. tax system.
Postwar Visions of a New Fiscal Order
After the war ended in November 1918, many of the Treasury lawyers
actively returned to the private sector. Roper led many of his BIR col-
leagues into a burgeoning Washington, D.C. consulting and tax law prac-
tice, only to return to public life as Franklin D. Roosevelt's secretary of
commerce. 123 Love was equally eager to return to the private sector and
Texas politics, as he leveraged his Washington, D.C. contacts to develop
a lucrative postwar legal practice. 124 Ballantine also returned to private
practice after the war, eventually joining the New York law firm that
would become Dewey, Ballantine. Throughout the 1920s, he led the
firm's tax practice and became a leading voice of the evolving tax bar.
In 1931, he returned to Washington to serve as his Harvard classmate
Ogden Mills's Treasury undersecretary. 12 5
Leffingwell, by contrast, remained at Treasury to ensure a smooth post-
war transition. He served McAdoo and his immediate successor Carter
Glass admirably, gaining the respect of both men.' 2 6 Leffingwell relished
his role as a government official, and he did not hide his disappointment
when President Wilson selected David F. Houston, the secretary of agricul-
ture, as Glass's successor ahead of Leffingwell. He rejoined the Cravath
tax-paying ability of the enterprise enjoying, perhaps through war conditions, a very high
return upon its investment" (Ibid).
123. Roper, Fifty Years, 170-71, 211, 269-70.
124. Thomas B. Love to Kermit Roosevelt, January 26, 1916; Love to Kermit Roosevelt,
September 23, 1919, Kermit Roosevelt Papers, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division,
Washington, D.C.
125. Urofsky, "Ballantine, Arthur Atwood."
126. After the war, Glass commended Leffingwell as being "an indispensable factor in the
most important activities of the Department." Similarly, McAdoo recalled that he valued
how Leffingwell, the "Wall Street Republican," challenged his ideas without being disloyal.
"While [Leffingwell's] point of view and mine were frequently at variance, nevertheless
these differences were brought out in argument and enabled me to reach decisions with
greater confidence and satisfaction to myself than if he had agreed with me about every-
thing," wrote McAdoo. "Whenever I made a final decision Leffingwell acquiesced and car-
ried it out with loyalty and energy" (Carter Glass to Leffingwell, February 2, 1920, quoted in
Pulling, Selected Letters of R. C. Leffingwell, 9; McAdoo, Crowded Years, 430; Murray,
"Bureaucracy and Bipartisanship").
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firm in 1920 but soon left to take a senior position at the investment house
of J. P. Morgan. 12 7
It did not take long for the lawyers to realize the historical significance of
their government service. In a series of correspondence in the fall of 1919,
Roper and Leffingwell assessed their contributions and shared their
respective visions of a postwar fiscal order. The seasoned administrators
reflected on how the past three years had dramatically changed the every-
day operations of the federal fiscal system. Building upon their experi-
ences, Roper and Leffingwell discussed how they could make the tax
collection process even more effective after the war. Roper made two prin-
cipal policy proposals. First, he recommended the creation of a "Court of
Internal Revenue Tax Appeals" to adjudicate appeals directly from the dis-
trict courts. Second, and perhaps more important, he suggested that the
Treasury consider fundamentally restructuring the tax system to focus on
"revenue sources" that might be collected "with the least inconvenience
to taxpayers."' 28
Roper's recommendations elicited a mixed response from Leffingwell.
Leffingwell was "quite taken with the idea of a Court of Internal
Revenue Tax Appeals."'1 9 Both Roper and Leffingwell understood how
the complexity of wartime tax laws raised numerous legal questions and
burdened the judicial system. It was essential, Roper observed, revealing
his unquestioned faith in expertise, to have these complex legal issues
"considered by men especially trained in Internal Revenue Taxation," so
that "a sound basis of internal revenue court decisions may be assured
for both the benefit of the Government and the taxpayer."' 30 Leffingwell
agreed. Providing taxpayers with a stable and predictable set of tax laws
had been one of the hallmarks of the wartime Treasury. And having a
quasi-independent judiciary of professionally trained tax experts was cer-
tainly one way to institutionalize the consistent resolution of tax
127. Writing to a friend in 1952, Leffingwell recounted that he was disappointed but not
surprised to learn that Wilson had appointed Houston ahead of him. After all, Leffingwell
was neither a Democrat nor a close friend of Wilson's. "Under all the circumstances,"
Leffingwell wrote, "it was most natural and proper for the President to appoint a long-time
friend and Democrat and trusted Cabinet minister to this high office, instead of a stranger
whom he knows only by reputation" (quoted in Pulling, Selected Letters of
R. C. Leffingwell, 7). Leffingwell's postwar status as a partner in J. P. Morgan probably
also cost him an appointment in Franklin Roosevelt's administration (Schuker,
"Leffingwell, Russell Cornell," in Dictionary of American Biography, 377; Swaine,
Cravath Firm, 2:315).
128. Daniel C. Roper to Russell C. Leffingwell, October 17, 1919, NARA Excess Profits
Tax Folder.
129. Leffingwell to Roper, October 20, 1919, NARA Excess Profits Tax Folder.
130. Roper to Leffingwell, October 17, 1919, NARA Excess Profits Tax Folder.
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controversies, and thus provide the type of formal rationality that state-
builders craved. Such a court could also carve out an autonomous insti-
tutional sphere for the nascent tax bar. Although Leffingwell did not elab-
orate on this self-serving possibility, a specialized court of tax appeals
could protect the profession's monopoly on the provision of scarce legal
services and thereby enhance the collective power of lawyers within the
new polity. It could also further the stratification of the bar, setting tax
law experts apart from other corporate and business lawyers.1 3 1
If Leffingwell supported the idea of a specialized tax appeals court, he
was less enthusiastic about Roper's suggestion to alter revenue sources.
Similar calls to return to a more "convenient" system of broad-based tariffs
and excise taxes were being made by Sen. Reed Smoot (R-UT) and other
congressional opponents of progressive income and wealth-transfer taxes.
To Leffingwell, this recommendation seemed to hearken back to the prewar
regime of regressive indirect taxation-a system that Leffingwell believed
was rendered obsolete by the successful administration of the wartime tax
policies. Leffingwell informed Roper that his suggestion "if pressed to the
limit.., would mean that we should have nothing but indirect taxes such
as the protective tariff, the excess profits tax, and the consumption tax."1 32
A return to the old fiscal regime meant a return to a regressive, opaque, and
ultimately undemocratic system of public finance. "In the case of indirect
taxes the whole community pays through increased cost of living, and there
is a minimum of inconvenience to the taxpayers," Leffingwell conceded.
"Indeed, most of them know nothing about it." This invisible form of
taxation violated the principles of democracy and modem economics by
favoring convenience of collections over the transparency of direct taxa-
tion. "I take it that it is good democratic doctrine--certainly it is good
economics" wrote Leffingwell, "that a direct tax, such as the income tax,
which inevitably involves a certain amount of inconvenience to the tax-
payer, is to be preferred to the indirect tax which involves none at all." 133
131. A Court of Internal Revenue Tax Appeals did not come into being, but this idea may
have been the kernel that led to the creation of specialized federal trial courts for tax issues,
the U.S. Board of Tax Appeals, which was a forerunner of today's U.S. Tax Courts (Harold
Dubroff, The United States Tax Court: An Historical Analysis [Chicago: Commerce
Clearing House, 1979]). Tax scholars have analyzed the case for a specialized court of
tax appeals, see William D. Popkin, "Why a Court of Tax Appeals is So Elusive," Tax
Notes, May 28, 1990, 1101-10; Griswold, "The Need for a Court of Tax Appeals,"
Harvard Law Review 57 (1944): 1153.
132. Leffingwell to Roper, October 20, 1919, NARA Excess Profits Tax Folder; "Three
Plans for Tax Revision" New York Times, December 21, 1919, 38.
133. Leffingwell to Roper, October 20, 1919, NARA Excess Profits Tax Folder.
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Although Leffingwell did not elaborate on what he meant by "good
democratic doctrine," his ideas and actions during his tenure in the
Treasury Department suggest that he had in mind the inextricable link
that existed between direct taxes, democracy, and fiscal citizenship.
Since the late nineteenth century, tax reformers and political
economists had been claiming that the "inconvenience" of direct levies
on income, profits, and inheritances made citizens more attuned to the
workings of the state, that paying taxes directly to the federal government
gave citizens a greater stake in how public funds were raised and used, and
that direct taxation ultimately helped forge a renewed sense of civic
identity. 134
Leffingwell and the other Treasury lawyers endorsed these views with
their actions, if not their words. In the process of building Treasury's
administrative capacity during the war, they sought to assure taxpayers
that revenues were collected in a consistent and equitable manner. By clar-
ifying the operations of complex new rules and by evaluating and reeval-
uating the income and profits taxes, the lawyers helped build the trust
between citizens and their government that was essential to the success
of a liberal democracy engaged in global war. But they also did much
more. Their vision for a postwar fiscal order, reflected in Leffingwell's
remarks to Roper, went beyond simply using direct taxes to imbue citizens
as stakeholders with a sense of belonging to a new national community.
The Treasury lawyers knew all too well that even the robust wartime tax
laws affected only a small fraction of U.S. citizens. In rebuking Roper's
suggestion to alter revenue sources, Leffingwell focused, once again, on
the state's fiscal obligations to its citizens, on the responsibility of govern-
ment officials to distribute equitably and effectively the fiscal burdens of
financing a modem industrial democracy. This was one way of striking
the balance between justice and revenue.
Conclusion
The Great War fundamentally transformed nearly every aspect of
American society, including the national system of public finance. The
conceptual transformation underpinning the rise of a new fiscal order
had its roots in the economic, legal, and social turmoil of the late nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries. But it was the war that fortified the
federal government's use of direct and progressive taxes. It was the war
134. See, for example, Ely, Taxation in American States and Cities; and Seligman, The
Income Tax.
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that triggered the unprecedented interdependence of state and society, and
the attendant explosive growth in federal spending and administrative
capacity. And it was the war that ushered in a new fiscal state and all
that the new polity stood for.
Although the global conflict provided the historical conditions for a
fiscal and administrative revolution, it was state actors who seized this
opportunity to shape the emerging fiscal polity into their particular vision
of a robust and just legal Leviathan. Their vision did not always correspond
with the public interest. The legal professionals who worked in the Wilson
administration's Treasury Department were by no means purely valiant tri-
bunes of the people. In helping to formulate policy, they privileged their
administrative expertise over the popular will of social groups and elected
lawmakers. In recruiting and staffing their offices, they assisted personal
friends and former colleagues, while they developed the potential for a
lucrative area of postwar practice.
Indeed, the Treasury lawyers were among the post-World War I govern-
ment officials who helped grease the revolving door between the public
and private sectors and thus set the mold for future generations of
"Washington Lawyers." Despite their allegiance to the wartime state,
these elite lawyers could not divorce themselves from their intractable pro-
fessional faith in corporate capitalism as the source of economic growth
and productivity. Even when they intended to spread the war costs more
evenly across regions, classes, and generations, the unpredictable dynamics
of war often overwhelmed their intentions and aims.
Still, the Treasury lawyers used their networks, skills, and experience to
navigate the wartime fiscal system between the extremes of radical change
and conservative inertia. From creating an executive agency committed
to building public trust and enhancing its own administrative capacity,
to formulating broad policies that spotlighted the reciprocal rights and
obligations of fiscal citizenship, to evaluating and defending the novel
excess profits tax, to developing the parameters of the postwar fiscal
order, the Treasury lawyers helped not only to underwrite the Allied vic-
tories in Europe, but also to strengthen the revenue-generating powers of
the burgeoning modem American liberal state.
The fiscal regime forged during the Great War did not simply wither
away after the conflict. Although some opponents of direct and progressive
taxation attempted to return the U.S. system of public finance to the regres-
sive prewar regime of tariffs and excise taxes, the new fiscal polity proved
remarkably resilient. The war-related budget deficits, to be sure, provided a
structural floor on the ability of lawmakers to eviscerate the new and robust
taxing powers, even as the scale and scope of federal taxing powers were
retrenched. But the durability of the new fiscal system owed just as much to
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the patterns of financing established by the wartime Treasury Department.
The modem American fiscal polity, in sum, went through a formative
period of administrative development during the Great War. For it was
during this period of national emergency that the Treasury lawyers exer-
cised their new found taxing powers to build the administrative foundations
of a new fiscal order.
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